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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 53 SUMMER 1979 NUMBER 4
THE DEVELOPING NOTION OF EMPLOYER
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ALCOHOLIC,
DRUG-ADDICTED OR MENTALLY ILL
EMPLOYEE: AN EXAMINATION UNDER
FEDERAL AND STATE EMPLOYMENT
STATUTES AND ARBITRATION DECISIONS
JANET MALESON SPENCER*
INTRODUCTION
It is a generally accepted notion that an individual who wishes
to obtain or retain a job has certain responsibilities. For example,
he is responsible for performing his job satisfactorily, complying
with reasonable work rules and showing up for work. If the individ-
ual will not live up to his responsibilities, the employer is under no
obligation to him-he may refuse to hire him or, if already em-
ployed, he may fire him.' A further aspect of this notion is that these
* Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., Cornell Univer-
sity, 1959; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1962; Member, National Panel of Labor Arbitration
Association; Member, Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service.
, At common law, an employer has the right, in the absence of a contractual agreement
to the contrary, to hire and fire as he pleases, without regard to the employee's compliance
with his responsibilities. See, e.g., Young v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 424 F.2d 256 (8th
Cir. 1970); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-Reno Co., 64 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1933);
Wilson v. Woodward Iron Co., 362 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ala. 1973). A protected right to
employment has been recognized, however, in situations where the preservation or effectua-
tion of constitutional or statutory rights is at stake. Thus, preemptive legislation has accorded
some protection for employees subject to "at will" employment arrangements. See, e.g.,
Consumer Credit Protection Act, § 304(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976) (proscribing discharge
on the basis of garnishment of an employee's wages); National Labor Relations Act § 8(3),
29 U.S.C. § 158(3) (1976) (unfair labor practice for employer to discriminate in hiring or firing
because of labor organization participation); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§ 4, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1976), as amended by Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2, 92 Stat. 189 (prohibiting employment discrimination
on the basis of age); Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C.
§§ 2021-2024 (1976) (ensuring for returning veterans reinstatement in their former positions
with the right not to be discharged within the first six months except upon a showing of just
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responsibilites are the employee's responsibility, not the employer's.
The employer's interest is in operational efficiency. If the employee
is deficient, the employer need not be concerned with the reasons
for the deficiency. Indeed, it may be improper for the employer to
interject himself into the employee's personal life.
In most instances these basic principles work well. Difficulty
emerges, however, when one seeks to apply them to mentally dis-
turbed, alcoholic or drug-addicted employees ("troubled employ-
ees"). We may assume that for most employees, failure to live up
to basic responsibilities is voluntary. Troubled employees, however,
may be unable voluntarily to comply with the employer's require-
ments.' Of course, there may be others, such as the hopelessly ill or
cause); Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-W(a)(1) (1976) (forbidding
employment discrimination on grounds of race, sex, religion, or national origin). In addition,
several recent decisions have engrafted upon these statutory exceptions a judicially recog-
nized right against retaliatory, "bad faith", or malicious discharges. See, e.g., Petermann v.
Local 396, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Framp-
ton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). Courts have consistently refused, however, to recog-
nize a cognizable property right in employment which is entitled to fourteenth amendment
protection. See, e.g., Charland v. Norge Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 407 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1969); Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 382 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Mich.
1974); Carraway v. Jefferson Parish School Bd., 251 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. La. 1966).
The employee is afforded a greater degree of security when his tenure is pursuant to an
enforceable employment contract. The law is well settled that a contract for a stated term
may be cancelled, and the employee discharged, only upon a showing of good cause or mutual
agreement. See, e.g., Seco Chems., Inc. v. Stewart, 349 N.E.2d 733 (Ind. App. 1976); Crane
v. Perfect Film & Chem. Corp., 38 App. Div. 2d 288, 329 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1st Dep't 1972).
For a general discussion of the respective rights of employer and employee in at-will and
contractual employment relationships, see Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Free-
dom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967);
Comment, Employment at Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BUFFALO L. Rxv. 211 (1973);
Note, Employment at Will-Limitations on Employer's Freedom to Terminate, 35 LA. L.
Rxv. 710 (1975).
2 H. TRICE & J. BELASCO, THe ALCOHOLIC AND His STEWARD: A UNION PROBLEM 12 (1965).
"Voluntary" compliance, even by a non-alcoholic employee, necessarily reflects certain exter-
nal considerations when examined in the context of the workplace. Even the "normal" worker
will sense mild coercion in complying with the requirements of his employer when he contem-
plates the possible ramifications of non-compliance. Progressive and corrective discipline
presuppose that the objectionable behavior is volitional and therefore may be voluntarily
altered or discontinued. The troubled employee may be repeatedly involved in disciplinary
infractions, however, because he cannot respond to this mild coercion because of his problem.
"Constructive coercion" and "coercive confrontation" are alternative appellations for an
employment policy that seeks to force an alcoholic to recognize his illness and take steps
toward rehabilitation. See id. at 8; Somers, Alcohol and the Just Cause for Discharge,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH ANN. MEETING OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 103, 116 (B.
Dennis & G. Somers, eds. 1975). The application of external pressure through the imposition
of disciplinary sanctions is aimed at precipitating a crisis whereby the problem drinker will
realize that, if he fails to avail himself of treatment resources and make progress toward
rehabilitation, his job will be in jeopardy. Somers, supra, at 116. The relatively low rehabilita-
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the total incompetenf, who are unable voluntarily to live up to their
responsibilities. In contrast, the mentally disturbed, the alcoholic
and the drug addict may, with help, be able to do so.3
As a result of the anomalies presented in applying to the trou-
bled employee general notions regarding the allocation of responsi-
bility, different rules have developed. In the case of the troubled
employee, it appears that the responsibilities normally resting with
the employee are to an increasing extent being shared with the
employer. The traditional view that the employer has no responsi-
bility for the personal life or problems of his employees is eroding.
How has this come to pass and what is the nature of the employer's
responsibility today?
There have always been, to be sure, reasons for the employer
to concern himself with the troubled employee's problems. One
important reason is financial. Often, the result of the troubled em-
ployee is impaired work product. Yet, even where this occurs, the
tion rate of persons undergoing treatment, only 25% to 40% by some estimates, may be
indicative of the inappropriateness and perhaps the futility of corrective discipline in dealing
with manifestations of addictive behavior. H. TRICE & J. BEnsco, supra, at 11.
While the voluntary nature of the alcoholic's addiction has been the subject of considera-
ble study in the last decade, no consensus has been reached by the scientific community.
There appear to be indications, however, that alcoholism may be precipitated by physiologi-
cal factors and that heredity may play a role in creating a physical predisposition to addiction
in some individuals. Meyers & Melchior, Alcoholic Drinking: Abnormal Intake Caused by
Tetrahydropapaueroline in Brain, 196 SCIENCE 554 (1977); see A Chemical Cause of
Alcoholism, 111 SCIENCE NEws 327 (1977); Alcohol Metabolism: All in the Family, 115 ScIENcE
NEws 6 (1979). But see Can Alcoholics Drink? NEWSWEEK, June 21, 1976, at 58; Booze for
Alcoholics, TIME, June 21, 1976, at 45.
Judicial consideration of the volitional issue has produced a qualified concession to the
drug addict's and alcoholic's lack of control over his use of intoxicants, particularly in the
area of criminal responsibility for the "status" of addiction, see Robinson v. State, 370 U.S.
660 (1962), and for public intoxication, see, e.g., Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). In Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514 (1968), the Supreme Court, although narrowly rejecting an appeal by a chroni-
cally alcoholic defendant convicted of public intoxication, appears to have embraced, or at
least expressed sympathy with, the disease concept of alcoholism.
Protection of other arguably volitional conditions or preferences has received variable
acceptance by the courts. See Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1977); Voyles
v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 570 F.2d 354
(9th Cir. 1978) (holding that discrimination against transexuals is not sex discrimination
within the meaning of Title VII); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D.
Ga. 1975), aff'd, 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978) (homosexuals are not within the Title VII
proscription against sex discrimination). But see Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Depart-
ment of Indus. Lab. & Human Relations, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 1811 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1975)
(discrimination based on handicap of alcoholism is unlawful); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp.
791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (former drug addicts are entitled to protection from discriminatory
employment practices under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
1 See notes 56-60, 133 and accompanying text infra.
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employer, as a practical matter, cannot readily remove the troubled
employee from his work force. Coemployees and supervisors, out of
sympathy, identification, or distaste for confrontation, tend to pro-
tect or cover-up for the troubled employee.4 Thus, although their
performance is inadequate, these employees may continue in the
work force for a long time, often until discharge is provoked by some
crisis.5 The cost of employee retention to the employer can be stag-
gering. Although figures are not available for the mentally disturbed
or the drug addict, estimates of employed alcoholics in the United
States range from two million to nine million, comprising at least
six to ten percent of any employee population.' Lost revenues as a
I H. TRICE & J. BELASCO, EMOTIONAL HEALTH AND EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY 18, 23 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY].
I EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY, supra, note 4; at 23; Somers, supra note 2, at 113. Crisis-
precipitated discharges comprise the majority of published arbitration cases involving
alcohol-related dismissals, probably because the quantum of proof necessary to establish
"just cause" is more easily met by an overt act of violence or insubordination. Id. at 109-11.
The more subtle decline in productivity normally characterizing the developing alcoholic is
more difficult to prove as a contractual infraction justifying discharge, and the employer will
often be hard-pressed to demonstrate "just cause" on the basis of excessive absenteeism
because physicians as well as spouses are often willing to cover up for alcohol-related ab-
sences. Id. at 109. Thus, of all discharge grievances reaching arbitration, only eight per cent
arise from absenteeism. Id. at 111.
Notwithstanding crisis-precipitated discharge, arbitrators often reinstate deviant trou-
bled employees. See, e.g., Prescolite v. IBEW, Local 2131, 71 Lab. Arb. 613 (1978) (Bridgewa-
ter, Arb.); Standard Packaging Corp. v. Graphics Arts Int'l Union, Local 14B, 71 Lab. Arb.
445 (1978) (Fogelberg, Arb.); Warner & Swasey Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
Local Lodge No. 1253, 71 Lab. Arb. 158 (1978) (Siegel, Arb.). Fifty-five percent of emotionally
disturbed and alcoholic employees are reinstated after discharge. EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY,
supra note 4, at 18. Reasons most commonly advanced for reinstatement include insufficient
evidence, mitigating circumstances and lack of consistent policy. Id. Half are redischarged,
however, often for the same infraction. H. TRICE & J. BELASCO, supra note 3, at 11.
' Brant, The Labor Scene, 7 LABOR-MANAGEMENT ALCOHOLISM J. 17, 23 (Mar.-Apr.
1978); Brant, Labor's Role in Occupational Alcoholism-New Developments, 6 LABOR-
MANAGEMENT ALCOHOLISM J. 41, 42 (July-Aug. 1976); Hill, Alcoholism and the World of Work,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH ANN. MEETING OF THE NAT'L AcAD. OF ARBITRATORS 93, 94 (B. Dennis
& G. Somers eds. 1975); Ogden & Hodges, A Labor Initiated Model, 6 LABOR-MANAGEMENT
ALCOHOLISM J. 8 (May-June 1977); Alcoholism and Employee Relations: A BNA Special
Report, [1978] 99 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 1, 1 [hereinafter cited as BNA Report].
A joint survey of the members of the American Society for Personnel Administration
(ASPA) was conducted by ASPA and the Bureau of National Affairs in 1978. According to
their findings, 25% of the responding companies reported that alcoholism was a problem for
10% or more of their production forces. Fourteen to fifteen percent of these companies re-
ported a similar rate of alcohol abuse among their professional, managerial, and office work-
ers. Alcoholism was reported as affecting 4.6% of both professional and managerial employ-
ees; 3.8% of office or clerical workers; and 7.7% of production or service employees. BNA
Report, supra, at 4. This differential between the blue-collar group and management, how-
ever, may be illusory. Because of his relative freedom from observation and supervision, the
executive alcoholic may merely be harder to isolate. H. TRICE & J. BELASCO, supra note 2, at
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result of alcoholic workers are calculated at one billion to twenty
billion dollars annually.' As a result of absenteeism, accidents, med-
ical bills, lack of production and the like, it has been estimated that
each alcoholic employee represents a minimum cost to his employer
of one-quarter of his annual salary.'
In addition to financial considerations, altruism may motivate
the employer's concern with the troubled employee's personal prob-
lems. Although an employer's primary interest is in operational
efficiency, he also may have a humane interest in his employees. He
may recognize that rehabilitation of the troubled employee is a
desirable goal from all points of view9 and be persuaded that the
work place presents a uniquely favorable environment in which the
employee can be motivated to seek help.' 0
Once it is accepted that an employer may be furthering his own
interest by "concerning" himself with his troubled employees rather
than by assuming that the problems they present will disappear, the
question must be how the employer can do so constructively. For
most, the answer to this question will be that the employer must
I Brant, The Labor Scene, 7 LABOR-MANAGEMENT ALCOHOLISM J. 23 (Mar.-Apr. 1978);
BNA Report, supra note 7, at 1. Some estimates run as high as $25 billion. Godwin, The
Problems of Alcoholism in Industry, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH ANN. MEETING OF THE NAT'L
AcAD. OF ARBITRATORS 97, 97 (B. Dennis & G. Somers eds. 1975). See generally UNrrED STATES
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SECOND SPECIAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH 37 (1974).
9 BNA Report, supra note 6, at 1, 8. The drinking employee is a financial liability in
many facets of the work setting, but absenteeism is the central operational problem generated
by alcoholism. Somers, supra note 2, at 111. See generally Trice, The Job Behavior of Problem
Drinkers, reprinted in SoCIETY, CULTURE, AND DRINKING PATTERNS 493-510 (D. Pittman & C.
Snyder eds. 1962). In addition, studies by the National Institute on Alcoholism and Alcohol
Abuse (NIAAA), found that alcoholic employees are responsible for 5% of all annual insur-
ance claims, and the accident rate for alcoholic employees is 3.6 times that of nonalcoholic
workers. BNA Report, supra note 7, at 10. But see H. TRICE & J. BELASCo, supra note 2, at 4.
It has also been alleged that 70% of union grievances are in some way alcohol-related. Brant,
supra note 7, at 23.
' See 124 CONG. REC. S19001-02 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
According to congressional fact finders, many large corporations consider discharge to be an
undesirable alternative in dealing with employees troubled by alcohol. Id.
"0 See Godwin, supra note 7, at 98; UNrTE STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, supra note 7, at 129. The effectiveness of the work setting in interrupting the
addictive patterns of alcoholism derives perhaps from three major sources: the opportunity
for early detection, see note 11 infra, motivation to undergo rehabilitative treatment in order
to avoid disciplinary action or termination, see note 2 supra, and the proximity of available
services. The concept of "in house" rehabilitation programs is generally a misnomer when
applied to the operational realities of the majority of alcoholism treatment services imple-
mented by industry. Typically, the employee-assistance program is not oriented toward treat-
ment in the work setting. Rather, the troubled employee generally is connected with
community-based resources best suited to his needs. Hill, supra note 6, at 96.
1979]
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assume responsibility for the troubled employee to this extent-he
must provide means by which the troubled employee is identified
at an early stage and is motivated to seek rehabilitation." To do'this
effectively, the employer may establish an occuptional program for
the identification and rehabilitation of the troubled employee. 2 The
" The earliest occupational alcoholism programs encountered problems in implementing
identification procedures, apparently because of the criterion utilized. Companies instituting
management control systems in the 1940's through the 1960's set out to identify the alcoholic
population among their employees by training their supervisors to recognize physical mani-
festations of alcohol abuse, such as slurred speech, tremors, staggering gait, and alcohol-
ladened breath. Hill, supra note 6, at 95. Since this forced supervisory personnel into a
paternalistic and moralistic posture in which they were not comfortable, a phenomenon
labelled "supervisory wobble" emerged, in which the supervisor hesitated to report even
obviously deviant behavior. H. TRIcE & P. RoMAN, Spmrrs AND DEMONS AT WORK 37-38 (1972).
Often years passed while the supervisor ignored or covered up the situation to the employee's
physical detriment and the company's financial loss. Id. As greater understanding of identifi-
cation procedures developed, however, a more objective criterion, job impairment, was intro-
duced. Under this approach, the supervisor could now abandon his inappropriate role as
diagnostician and instead focus upon more empirical manifestations of the alcoholic em-
ployee, such as decreased productivity, recurrent illness, unauthorized absenteeism, and
frequency of on-the-job injuries. Hill, supra note 6, at 95. Employee acceptance of occupa-
tional alcoholism programs continued to be limited, however, because they were still denomi-
nated "alcoholism programs," carrying with them the connotations and social stigma at-
tached to that label. Id. In 1971, a survey conducted by the NIAAA revealed an innovative
and effective technique for identification currently gaining increasing acceptance among
employers. Under this new approach, supervisory personnel are trained to recognize the
"troubled employee" rather than the "alcoholic" exclusively. The advantages of this more
generic test lie in abandoning the stigma attaching to an "alcoholism" program, reducing the
reluctance of supervisors to identify deviant behavior by restoring them to their more appro-
priate role of evaluating job performance, and identifying more problem drinkers at earlier
stages of their addiction, thus facilitating less costly and more effective rehabilitation efforts.
Id. at 95-96; UNrrD STATES DRP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, supra note 7, at 131.
Five elements have been characterized as essential to the successful implementation of early
identification programs, focusing primarily on intra-organizational dissemination of informa-
tion. These include: a written policy setting forth the specifics of the program, including a
declaration that alcoholism is a disease and that afflicted employees will not be penalized
for participation in the program; establishing channels within the organization for counselling
and referral services; instruction at the managerial and supervisory levels regarding their
respective roles in implementing the program; education of the entire work force concerning
policy and procedure; and cooperation between management and labor unions, where applic-
able. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, supra note 7, at 129-30;
Somers, supra note 2, at 104-05. For the most recent and comprehensive study using these
and additional criteria in establishing a complex treatment center, see C. SCHRAMM, W.
MANDELL & J. ARCHER, WORKERS WHO DRINK (1978).
12 While the number of businesses instituting in-house alcoholism programs appears to
be steadily increasing, the existence of these programs is still the exception. In 1974, there
were 621 employee-alcohol programs in various stages of development in both the public and
private sectors. Hill, supra note 6, at 97; Somers, Evaluating Occupational Programs: A Joint
Union-Management Approach to Alcoholism, 5 LABOR-MANAGEMENT ALCOHOUSM J. 21 (May-
June 1976)- (citing NIAAA Information & Feature Service: Special Report: Occupational
Alcoholism 1 (1974)). Within a year, the number of occupational alcoholism programs had
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employer who establishes an occupational program generally is re-
warded. The cost of such programs to the employer is well out-
weighed by the costs traceable to the presence of the troubled em-
ployee in the work force,"3 and rate of recovery is often high.'4 More-
over, there are few instances of grievances or arbitrations arising
from alcohol-related problems. 5
Notwithstanding the cost advantage to employers in assuming
responsibility for their troubled employees, the number of occupa-
tional programs is still relatively small.'" Apparently, cost effective-
ness and altruism alone have not sufficed to trigger a universal,
voluntary assumption of responsibility. 7 It is the author's view that
risen to 740, conducted primarily in larger businesses. Godwin, supra note 7, at 103. Recent
estimates fix the number of companies providing alcoholism programs at approximately 1000,
while the total number of treatment programs of every kind, including business, labor, joint
labor-management, government and professional, has reached 2500. BNA Report, supra note
6, at 4. This figure, however, remains only one-hundredth of one percent of the over one
million companies in existence in the United States. Dunkin, Why Isn't Management Buying
Our Product?, 3 LABOR-MANAGEMFNT ALCOHOLISM J. 20 (Jan.-Feb. 1974).
13 The financial merits of in-house treatment and counselling services are well-
documented. Although some commentators believe altruism is a motivational factor, e.g.,
Telephone Conversation with William S. Dunkin, Labor-Management Services, National
Council on Alcoholism (June 1978), cost efficiency is more likely to be the compelling reason
behind the institution of alcohol counselling services. Bailar, Editorial, 7 LABOR-MANAGEMENT
ALCOHOLISM J. 20, 20 (Mar.-Apr. 1978); BNA Report, supra note 6, at 12; Tucker,
Comment, reprinted in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH ANN. MEETING OF THE NAT'L AcAD. OF
ARBITRATORS, 117, 118 (1975). Industries that have demonstrated an increasing espousal of
alcohol rehabilitation programs, notably the airline and auto industries, have noted the
profitability of their investments. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, which began a rehabilitation
program in 1975, claimed a first-year return of 350% on its investment, calculated in terms
of reduced absenteeism, medical costs and accidents attributable to alcohol abuse. BNA
Report, supra note 6, at 5-6. In the second year of its operation, the program realized five
dollars for every program dollar spent. Id. at 6. Illinois Bell's program reports a benefit ratio
of 10 to 1. Id. Similar savings have been reported in the public sector. In 1969, the United
States Postal Service, in conjunction with the postal unions, initiated its Program for Alco-
holic Recovery (PAR). Bailar, supra, at 20. Presently covering in excess of 456,000 employees
in 122 offices throughout the country, PAR claims 10,000 recovered alcoholics to date. Id.
With such a rehabilitation rate, the Post Office estimates a net cost avoidance ratio of five
dollars for every program dollar spent. Id. See also Lord, Editorial, 4 LABOR-MANAGEMENT
ALCOHOLISM J. 22, 22 (Mar.-Apr. 1975).
11 A rate of recovery of 60% is not unusual. Conversation with Dr. Paul A. Sherman,
Director Special Program, ITT, formerly President of the Association of Labor-Management
Administrators and Consultants on Alcoholism (Mar. 1979).
" Brant, supra note 7, at 30, 37.
18 See note 12 supra.
l7 It has been suggested that reasons for this include the stigma of the alcoholic as a "skid
row bum" as well as a denial of the existence of the problem. Hill, supra note 6, at 95; H.
TRICE & J. BELASCO, supra note 2, at 2. The fallacy of the "skid row bum" stereotype is well
documented. Estimates fix the number of the nation's alcoholic population fitting within this
category between three and five percent. Hill, supra note 6, at 93; Logan, May a Man Be
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developments in the legal and arbitral environment, while not
overtly requiring the employer to assume responsibility for the
troubled employee, will subtly pressure him to do so. In due course,
his total assumption of responsibility for the troubled employee will
be the path of least resistance.
This Article will chart the evolution of the notion that the em-
ployer bears a certain responsibility for the troubled employee as it
has emerged through laws and arbitration decisions and will con-
sider the nature and scope of that responsibility.
OBLIGATIONS OF THE EMPLOYER TO TROUBLED EMPLOYEES UNDER
FEDERAL DISCRIMINATION LAWS
Until recently, federal prohibition of employment discrimina-
tion has been concentrated in areas unrelated to the handicapped.
Predominant among federal laws are Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), which prohibits employment discrimination
on the basis of sex, color, race, religion or national origin,"8 and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which protects individuals
between the ages of 40 and 70 from such discrimination. 9 It is fair
to say that Title VII and related federal laws have had "m enormous
impact on employment relations. Not only do these statutes affect
overtly discriminatory practices, but they have also called into
question traditional work modes which, while facially neutral, nev-
Punished Because He Is I1?, 52 A.B.A.J. 932, 933 (1966). The derogation of the alcoholic and
the alcohol abuser that nonetheless persists has been traced to the preoccupation with alcohol
and intemperance that permeated every segment of American society in the past, culminating
in national prohibition in the early part of the century. Godwin, supra note 7, at 98. This
lack of compassion has been deemed to be largely responsible for the neglect characterizing
industry's treatment of alcoholism in the work force. Id. at 99.
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
19 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), as amended by Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189.
Several other federal statutes proscribe discriminatory employment and admission prac-
tices. See, e.g., Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1405 (1976);
Education Amendment of 1972, § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976); Vietnam Era Veterans Read-
justment Asgistance Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (1976); Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act, § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 6005 (1976). See also Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 167
(1977), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,086, 3 C.F.R.
230 (1979).
Whereas this federal intervention applies to a broad cross section of private and public
sector employers, discriminatory practices of the many private employers not covered are
prohibited by numerous state laws. See notes 61-65 and accompanying text infra.
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ertheless disproportionately impact upon certain minority groups."
The role of the judiciary, which has been required to explore the
application and interpretation of these laws in great detail,2 ' like-
wise has been felt. Many employers, by choice or necessity, have
undertaken affirmative action programs to avoid culpability. 2  De-
spite the significant effects of this legislative-judicial effort, one
important segment of the workforce, comprised of mentally disa-
bled, drug addicted and alcoholic individuals, has been virtually
ignored.
The recent burgeoning of interest in handicap discrimination,
albeit in a limited way, is significant in light of the intense concern
with employment discrimination which has occurred within the
past 15 years. Although Title VII has not been extended to handicap
discrimination,2 it is possible that we are on the threshold of signifi-
See generally Blumosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MIcH. L. REv. 59 (1972); Hsia, The Effects Test:
New Directions, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 777 (1977); Comment, The Focal Issue: Discrimina-
tory Motivation orAdverse Impact? in Employment Discrimination: A Title VII Symposium,
34 LA. L. REv. 572 (1974).
21 See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), modified on rehearing en
banc, 452 F.2d 327, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). The affirmative action concept, as
opposed to a negative obligation of non-discrimination, first emerged by Executive Order. See
Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 86 (Supp. 1961), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. § 631, at 362
(1964), superceded by Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 167 (1977), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
2000e nt, at 10294 (1970), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,086, 3 C.F.R. 230 (1979). Prior
to Executive Order 11,246, Title VII had authorized courts to order "such affirmative action
as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970) (amended 1972). The affirmative action mandated
by Executive Order 11,246 is distinguishable from that authorized under Title VII in that the
latter is predicated upon a prior finding of discrimination. Thus, Title VII affirmative action
is remedial, while the 11,246 obligation is preventative.
u Neither Executive Order 10,925, which introduced the appellation, nor 11,246, which
superceded it, see note 21 supra, elaborated on the specifics of the "affirmative action"
obligation and, because the mandate failed to give rise to any adversarial proceedings until
nearly a decade after its inception, there were few judicial or administrative interpretations.
Note, Executive Order 11,246: Anti-Discrimination Obligations in Government Contracts, 44
N.Y.U.L. REv. 590, 592-93 (1969). The language of 11,246 seems to support a narrow construc-
tion. The "affirmative action" required by the order is that necessary to "ensure" compliance
by the individual company with anti-discrimination mandates. Exec. Order No. 11,246 § 202,
3 C.F.R. 167 (1977), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976), as amended by Exec. Order No.
12,086, 3 C.F.R. 230 (1979).
21 A plethora of unsuccessful bills have been introduced in recent years which would
amend Title VII to prohibit employment discrimination against the handicapped. See, e.g.,
S.446, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979); S.346, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 3345, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 609, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 373, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979);
S.1346, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 3504, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 1200, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 1107, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 461, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977); H.R. 264, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 13199, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974);
H.R. 10962, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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cant changes as a result of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the
Act) .24
At the time the Act was passed, and indeed for the preceding
half century, the rights of the handicapped had been a subject of
federal concern.25 This concern took the form of federal-state pro-
grams of vocational training and rehabilitation.2" With the passage
of the Act, and its subsequent amendments, 27 a new approach devel-
oped. No longer was the law limited to making handicapped indi-
viduals employable and to encouraging employers to hire them.
Instead, the Act imposed an obligation on certain employers to hire
the handicapped and declared that federal contracts and assistance
would be denied to noncomplying employers.28 Title V29 of the Act,
considered to be the "civil rights act for the handicapped,"30 con-
tains the major substantive provisions. Section 504 provides in per-
tinent part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States, as defined in section 7(6) of this Act, shall, solely by reason
of his handicap, be excluded from the particpation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .3
24 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976), as amended by Comprehensive Rehabilitation Services
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955.
" See generally J. NORTHRUP, OLD AGE, HANDICAPPED AND VIETNAM-ELA ANIDISCRIMI-
NATION LEGISLATION 69-70 (1977).
26 See H.R. REP. No. 95-1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, 8-9 (1978), reprinted in [1979]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7491-92, 7497-98; J. NORTHRUP, supra note 25, at 69-70. See
also Bayh, Foreword, Symposium-Employment Rights of the Handicapped, 27 DE PAUL L.
REV. 943, 943 (1978).
2 Comprehensive Rehabilitation Services Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92
Stat. 2955 (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (Supp. V 1975)), supplementing Rehabilitation
Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1619 (amending 29 U.S.C. § § 701-794
(Supp. IV 1974)).
2 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976); see 41 C.F.R. 60-741.28 (1978). The sanctions available to the
government in dealing with contractual infractions of this nature are numerous and a contrac-
tor's failure to conciliate a complaint may have serious ramifications. Not only is the Assist-
ant Secretary of Labor authorized by the regulations to enjoin the violation and demand
remedial relief, but he may debar delinquent contractors from receiving future contracts,
suspend, terminate, cancel or withhold progress payments on current contracts. See generally
Steadman, "Banned in Boston-and Birmingham and Boise... ": Due Process in the Debar-
ment and Suspension of Goverment Contractors, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 793 (1976).
21 29 U.S.C. §§ 790-794 (1976), as amended by Comprehensive Rehabilitation Services
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, §§ 505, 506, 92 Stat. 2955 (to be codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 795, 796).
11 Linn, Uncle Sam Doesn't Want You: Entering the Federal Stronghold of Employment
Discrimination Against Handicapped Individuals, Symposium-Employment Rights of the
Handicapped, 27 DR PAUL L. REv. 1047, 1047 (1978).
31 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
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This section would appear to protect handicapped individuals who
have any relationship with programs, institutions, or organizations
which receive federal funding.2 Section 503 extends the obligation
not to discriminate against the handicapped to federal contractors
and subcontractors.3
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Troubled Employee
Since the protection afforded by sections 503 and 504 of the Act
extends only to the "qualified handicapped individual, ' 34 a funda-
mental inquiry is to define a "qualified handicapped individual."
Section 7(6) of the Act defines "handicapped individual" as "any
person who (a) has a physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (b)
has a record of such an impairment or (c) is regarded as having such
an impairment. ' 35 Whether alcoholism or drug addicition is a
32 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(0 (1979). See also Guy, The Developing Law on Equal Opportun-
ity for the Handicapped: An Overview and Analysis of the Major Issues, 7 U. BALT. L. REv.
183, 199 n.47 (1978).
3 Section 503 provides in pertinent part:
Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or
agency for the procurement of personal property andnonpersonal services (includ-
ing construction) for the United States shall contain a provision requiring that, in
employing persons to carry out such contract the party contracting with the United
States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment quali-
fied handicapped individuals. . . . The provisions of this section shall apply to any
subcontract in excess of $2,500 entered into by a prime contractor in carrying out
any contract for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services
(including construction) for the United States.
29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1976).
In explaining the apparent inconsistency in the use of the phrase "otherwise qualified"
in § 504 while employing merely "qualified" in § 503, the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare has indicated that
[t]he Department believes that the omission of the word "otherwise" is necessary
in order to comport with the intent of the statute because, read literally,
"otherwise" qualified handicapped persons include persons who are qualified ex-
cept for their handicap, rather than in spite of their handicap. . . . In all other
respects, the terms "qualified" and "otherwise qualified" are intended to be inter-
changeable.
45 C.F.R. §§ 84.62-84.99 App. A, at 405 (1978).
3' 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794 (1976); see notes 31 & 33 and accompanying text supra.
1 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1976), as amended by Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-516 § 111(a), 88 Stat. 1619. The Act's original definition of "handicapped
individual" was framed in terms of amenability to rehabilitation, including within its ambit
only those persons with physical or mental disabilities resulting in substantial handicap to
employment who could "reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of employability from
vocational rehabilitation services provided pursuant to [the Act]." Rehabilitation Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7(6), 87 Stat. 361 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(6)). This definition
proved to be unworkable. Legislative history of the 1974 Amendments reveals that congres-
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''mental impairment" and thus a handicap was a hotly debated
subject although the question is now clarified by statute.3 6 The his-
torical development of the most recent amendments, the Compre-
hensive Rehabilitation Act Amendment of 1978, 3 is interesting be-
cause it has had an impact on the development of state laws and
reflects the concern and confusion over the status of alcoholism and
drug abuse.3 8
sional intent was to overcome the narrowness of the original definition. "The new definition
applied to Section 503 . . . in order to avoid limiting the affirmative action obligation of a
Federal contractor to only that class of persons who are eligible for vocational rehabilitation
services." S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6373, 6390.
Although the regulations promulgated by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs (OFCCP) fail to explain the term "physical or mental impairments," both the
HEW regulations and the Executive Order 11,914 regulations, enacted to coordinate enforce-
ment by all federal agencies dispensing financial assistance, provide that:
"Physical or mental impairment" means (A) any physiological disorder or condi-
tion, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the follow-
ing bodily systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory,
including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genitourinary;
hematic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine or (B) any mental or psychological
disorder such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
illness, and specific learning disabilities.
45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(j)(2)(i), 85.31(b)(1) (1978) (emphasis added). The Secretary of HEW has
noted that some of the specific diseases covered by the definition are "emotional illness and
• . . drug addiction and alcoholism." 42 Fed. Reg. 22685 (1977).
31 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1976), as amended by Comprehensive Rehabilitation Services
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602 § 122(a)(6)(C), 92 Stat. 2955; see notes,44 & 45 and
accompanying text infra.
3 Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (1978).
3' The Department of Labor, in its designated capacity as chief administrator of § 503
of the Act, see Exec. Order No. 11,758, 39 Fed. Reg. 2075 (1974), acted rapidly to bring
alcoholics and drug addicts within the definition of "handicapped individual." The OFCCP
took this position as early as February, 1975, when it began investigating complaints from
alcoholics and drug addicts. Letter from Secretary of Labor Marshall to Attorney General Bell
(April 12, 1977). In addition, the Department of Labor, in an official opinion released on
September 24, 1976, declared that alcholism and drug addiction were within the protection
of the Act. Notwithstanding the OFCCP position and the vigorous processing of a total of 18
alcoholism and drug abuse complaints between February, 1975, and March, 1977, the issue
whether alcoholics and drug addicts were to be included within the definition of
"handicapped individual" was apparently still in need of clarification in 1977.
Executive Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117-18 (1977), authorizes the Secretary of HEW to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement § 504 of the Act. In this context, Secretary of
HEW Califano formally requested the opinion of the Attorney General as to the applicability
of the statute to persons suffering from alcoholism and drug addiction. In his opinion letter,
Attorney General Bell squarely concluded that the term "handicapped individual" included
drug addicts and alcoholics for purposes of § 504 and, by implication, for purposes of §§ 501
and 503 as well. Unpublished Letter from Attorney General Bell to Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare Califano (April 12, 1977), cited at 42 Fed. Reg. 22686 (1977). In
reaching this finding, Bell apparently relied on the legislative history of the Act which,
although not specifically focusing on the problems of drug addiction and alcoholism, never-
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During the legislative process extensive amendments to the Act
were proposed.39 Some questions were raised regarding the applica-
tion of the Act to alcoholics and drug users,4" and it was feared that
the express extension of the Act to these individuals would lead to
such consequences as requiring airlines to hire alcoholic pilots or
drug companies to hire drug addicts.41 Thus, restrictive language
was proposed. 2 In conference, efforts were made to arrive at lan-
theless demonstrated a congressional understanding of HEW's "long-standing practice of
treating alcoholics and addicts as handicapped individuals eligible for rehabilitation services
under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act." Id. He further drew upon the weight of medical
and legal authority which regards both alcoholism and drug addiction as a disease. See Powell
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 522-24 (1968); id. at 550 (White, J., concurring); id. at 560-63 (Fortas,
J., dissenting); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). The opinion thus concluded
that drug addiction and alcoholism were "physical and mental impairments" within the
meaning of the Act.
The issue of the coverage of alcoholics and drug addicts was raised in the final stages of
preparation of the implementing regulations. One Senator noted that problems had arisen
because "[h]ypothetical examples of what these regulations night result in, such as putting
an active drug addict in charge of drug supplies in a hospital or having an active drug addict
hired to teach children" has created apprehensions as to the wisdom of such a measure. Letter
from Senator Williams to Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Califano (April 11,
1977). The Senator indicated, however, that these hypotheticals had served to divert atten-
tion from the real-life discrimination faced by addicts and alcoholics in medical care, voca-
tional training, and educational and employment opportunities and that "the present draft
regulations, as expressed in the preamble, cope quite reasonably. . .with any problems in
enforcement which might arise. They allow for legitimate distinctions to be made where these
addictions would pose problems in job performance and eligibility and where the condition
might interfere with the participation of others." Id.
Thus, in issuing the regulations, HEW undertook to assuage the apprehensions alluded
to by Senator Williams. The analysis accompanying the regulations stated:
The Secretary wishes to reassure recipients that inclusion of addicts and alco-
holics within the scope of the regulation will not lead to the consequences feared
by many commentators. . .. The fact that drug addiction and alcoholism may be
handicaps does not mean that these conditions must be ignored in determining
whether an individual is qualified for services or employment opportunities.
With respect to the employment of a drug addict or alcoholic, if it can be shown
that the addiction or alcoholism prevents successful performance of the job, the
person need not be provided the employment opportunity in question.
42 Fed. Reg. 22686 (1977).
Thus, it is apparent that HEW, at least since early 1977, and the Department of Labor,
since 1975, have regarded alcoholics and drug addicts, and the mentally ill within the cover-
age of §§ 504 and 503, respectively.
' See generally [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6246.
' See 41 Fed. Reg. 29548-50 (1976).
41 Id.; see Letter from Senator Williams to Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
Califano (April 11, 1977).
41 H. CoNF. REP. No. 95-1780, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7553, 7591. The House proposal provided that, for the purposes of
§§ 503 and 504, the term "handicapped individual" would not include alcoholics or drug
abusers "in need of rehabilitation." Id. at 7591. The Senate amendment, on the other hand,
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guage which would allay these fears and yet ensure that alcoholics
and drug users who were either recovered or in treatment would be
protected by the Act.43 In codifying the compromise language, and
thus adopting the official Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs (OFCCP) and Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW) standards," section 7(6) of the Act was amended to
include the following within the definition of "handicapped individ-
ual":
For purposes of section 503 and 504 as such sections relate to em-
ployment, such term does not include any individual who is an
alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drugs
prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in
question or whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol
or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property or the
safety of others.4 5
While it is clear that alcoholics and drug addicts falling outside
couched in terms of qualification for employment, provided: "[tihe term handicapped indi-
vidual does not include an alcoholic or drug abuser whose condition of alcoholism or drug
abuse renders that individual not qualified for employment by preventing him from perform-
ing the essential functions of the job." Id.
13 See note 42 supra.
" See note 38 supra.
,1 Comprehensive Rehabilitation Services Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602 §
122(a)(6)(C), 92 Stat. 2955 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1976)). The legislative history of
the 1978 amendments brings to light the fact that the pre-amendment scope of the Act
virtually was unchanged by this addendum. Senator Williams commented that the safety
concerns embodied in the amendment were "implicit in the act's limitation and in [the
provision] limiting protection to persons who would perform the essentials of the job." 124
CONG. REC. S19002 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Williams). Nevertheless, to meet
the apprehensions expressed by employers, "spelling out the safety concerns was felt [to be]
necessary," id., and thus, the amendment merely reflects the previously established congres-
sional intent. Id.; see note 38 supra.
The purpose of the amendment, as stated by Senator Williams, was to unequivocally
proscribe discrimination "against those persons having a history or condition of alcoholism
or drug abuse who are qualified for the particular employment they seek." Id. In support of
this mandate, the Senator noted that experiences of treatment professionals, major employ-
ers, and federal programs alike had demonstrated the ability of alcoholics and drug abusers
to be rehabilitated and to be successfully reintegrated into the workplace. Id. Therefore, the
import of the amendments lies in the directive that "an employer cannot assume that a
history of alcoholism or drug addiction, including a past addiction currently treated by
methadone maintenance, poses sufficient danger in and of itself to justify exclusion. Such
an assumption would have no basis in fact, and the act does not permit it." Id. This statement
recently was used as an argument before the Supreme Court in a brief in opposition to a
petition for a grant of certiorari. See Brief for Respondants at 68, New York City Transit
Authority v. Beazer, 99 S. Ct. 1355 (1979). Although certiorari was granted, the Court dec-
lined application of the Act to methadone users since the plaintiff's claim arose before passage
of the Act. 99 S. Ct. at 1363.
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these restrictions are now "handicapped individuals," the actual
extent of the protection afforded by the Act is muddled. The protec-
tion of the Act extends only to "qualified" handicapped persons,
and to date, there have been no definitive interpretations of this
term as it applies to the alcoholic or drug addict, either by the courts
or enforcement agencies.48 The Act makes clear that the employer's
,1 There is no definition of the term "qualified" in the text of the Act itself. As explicated
by the OFCCP regulations governing the administration of § 503, a handicapped person is
"qualified" only if he is "capable of performing a particular job, with reasonable accommoda-
tion to his or her handicap." 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1977). The HEW regulations and Executive
Order 11,914 impose an additional stipulation. Under their definition, a handicapped person
is qualified if he is capable of performing, with "reaonable accommodation," the "essential
functions" of the job. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(k)(1), 85.32(a) (1978). Under the HEW Secretary's
analysis, the addition emphasizes that a handicapped person will not be "unqualified"
merely because of difficulty in performing marginal tasks associated with the position in
question. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22686 (1977). With respect to federally financed educational
programs, the term "qualified" is defined by HEW as capable of meeting "the academic and
technical standards requisite to admission or participation in the recipient's educational
program or activity." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3) (1978). See Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 99 S. Ct. 2361, 2366 (1979). Thus, under the OFCCP and HEW regulations, considera-
tion of the "reasonable accomodation" concept is a condition precedent to a determination
of an individual's qualification for a job.
Recently, the Supreme Court delineated the scope of the employer's obligation under §
504. In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979), the plaintiff, who
suffered from a serious hearing disability, was rejected for admission to the defendant's state-
funded nursing program because the school believed that, relying on an audiologist's report,
the seriousness of the plaintiff's disability would make it unsafe for her to practice nursing.
Id. at 2364. The plaintiff filed suit alleging a violation of § 504 as amended. The district court
found for the defendant, holding that the plaintiff was not an "otherwise qualified handi-
capped individual" protected by § 504 because her disability would "sufficiently" prevent
her from performing in the nursing program. Id. at 2365. The fourth circuit reversed, holding
that it was error for the district court to have considered the nature of the plaintiffs handicap
in its determination of "otherwise qualified" rather than considering only her "academic and
technical qualifications." Id. at 2366. The circuit court further suggested that § 504 obligated
the school to take "affirmative conduct" to accommodate the plaintiff by modifying the
program, even if such was expensive. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "an 'otherwise qualified' person is one who is
able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap," id. (emphasis added),
and not one who meets the program's requirements except where limited by the handicap.
Id. at 2367. Under the Court's interpretation, then, the plaintiff was not protected by § 504
because she could not meet the legitimate physical qualifications necessary for the nursing
program. The Court further held that, under the language and legislative history of § 504,
affirmative action was not envisioned and that HEW was without authority to require such
an obligation under the statute. Id. at 2369-70. An important distinction, however, was made
by the Court. Whereas "substantial" modifications were found not to be contemplated within
tbhea nbit of the employer's duty to accommodate, the Court stated:
We do not suggest that the line between a lawful refusal to extend affirmative
action and illegal discrimination against handicapped persons will always be clear.
It is possible to envision situations where an insistence on continuing past require-
ments and practices might arbitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped
persons of the opportunity to participate in a covered program. . . .Thus situa-
tions may arise where a refusal to modify an existing program might become unrea-
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sole concern should be the employee's ability to do the job, even
where the employee is a current user of drugs or alcohol, as long as
his employment would not constitute a direct threat to property or
the safety of others." Certainly, then, the employer is prohibited
from considering the prior record or addiction of the recovered alco-
holic or drug user, although he may verify the employee's recent
work history to ensure that the employee is capable of satisfactory
performance.48 Presumably, if a troubled employee now claiming to
be recovered had a work record indicating that his alcoholism or
drug abuse had made him unable to work, the employer could re-
quire evidence of recovery. 49
The principles governing alcoholics and drug addicts should be
applicable to employees with histories of mental illness. Thus, while
the employer ought to be free to verify the employee's ability to
perform, he should not be permitted to assume that an individual
is not capable merely because of a prior history of mental illness. 0
sonable and discriminatory. Identification of those instances where a refusal to
accommodate the needs of a disabled person amounts to discrimination against the
handicapped continues to be an important responsibility of HEW.
Id. at 2370. The Court then limited its holding to the particular facts of the case, holding
that § 504 does not require a state-funded educational institution to make "substantial
change" in its program where such change would render unreasonable legitimate require-
ments. Id.
11 Comprehensive Rehabilitation Services Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602 §
122(a)(2)(C), 92 Stat. 2955 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1976)).
"' See 42 Fed. Reg. 22689 (1977). The HEW Secretary's analysis of the regulations pro-
mulgated to implement § 504 make it clear that the alcoholic or drug abuser, whether active
or recovered, must not be held to a less exacting standard in terms of job performance than
other employees or applicants. The Secretary noted that "in making employment decisions,
a recipient may judge addicts and alcoholics on the same basis it judges all other applicants
and employees. Thus, a recipient may consider . . . past personnel records, absenteeism,
disruptive, abusive or dangerous behavior, violations of rules, and unsatisfactory work per-
formance. Id. at 22686.
11 See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1977); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(k), 85.32 (1977).
10 The problem of employment for persons with histories of mental illness is particularly
acute. See generally Miller & Davison, Effects of Stigma on Re-employment of Ex-Mental
Patients, 49 MENTAL HYGIENE 281, 282-83 (1965); Olshansky, Grob & Malamud, Employers'
Attitudes and Practices in Hiring Ex-Mental Patients, 42 MENTAL HYGIENE 391, 394-95 (1958).
While employers' fears and prejudices regarding the employment of persons with histories of
mental illness continue to be strong, studies have indicated that apprehensions about the
safety of hiring ex-mental patients are largely unfounded. See Ling, An Investigation Into the
Readjustment to Work of Psychiatric Cases, 1 INr'L J. Soc. PSYCH. 18 (Autumn 1955). Indeed,
certain forms of mental illness do not interfere with job performance.
A review of back pay conciliation agreements through December, 1976, reveals that the
OFCCP is enforcing the Act on behalf of persons with heart trouble, ulcers, epilepsy, anemia
and mental illness, as well as those with more traditional handicaps. J. NoRTHRup, supra note
25 at 91-99 (1977). Northrup documents several cases involving mental and emotional prob-
lems. In one instance a job applicant who had been denied a position on the basis of his record
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While some forms of mental illness, even when current, may not
interfere with job performance, however, a question arises as to
whether an employer can determine that a particular job is psychol-
ogically unsuited to the mentally ill individual or the individual
who, although now recovered, may be vulnerable to relapse. The use
of employment tests to determine "qualification" for a particular
job is an especially troublesome problem where mental or personal-
ity considerations are factors.' Can one validate that a certain per-
sonality is incompatible with a specific job? For example, can an
employer effectively reject an applicant with a history of paranoia
from a position requiring team work even though that applicant has
a successful history as a night watchman? The lack of definitive
standards and the elusiveness of predicting job-relatedness of a par-
ticular mental handicap52 severely limits any expansive definition of
of mental illness was awarded almost $3000 in back pay, expurgation of his personnel record,
and the position for which he had previsouly applied. Id. at 98. But see Spencer v. Toussaint,
408 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (refusal to consider an applicant with history of mental
illness for the position of bus driver not unconstitutional).
It is interesting to note that, while the regulations do not specifically provide for back
pay awards in conciliation agreements, see 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.26(g), .28(a) (1978), the
OFCCP continues to implement this remedy for parties aggrieved under the Act. See Handi-
capped Workers Awarded Over $115,000 in Back Pay for Job Bias, DAILY LAB. REP. at A-2
(Jan. 10, 1977). The OFCCP relies upon the decision in United States v. Duquesne Light Co.,
423 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Pa. 1976), for its authority to invoke the equitable powers of the court
to require back pay and reinstatement.
51 The HEW regulations address the issue of preemployment testing and inquiry. Section
84.13 prohibits the recipient of federal funds from utilizing:
any employment test or other selection criterion that screens out or tends to screen
out handicapped persons or any class of handicapped persons unless: (1) the test
score or other selection criterion, as used by the recipient, is shown to be job-related
for the position in question, and (2) alternative job-related tests or criteria that do
not screen out or tend to screen out as many handicapped persons are not shown
by the Director to be available.
45 C.F.R. § 84.13(a) (1978). Thus, in light of the requirement that particular job standards
be validated, a requirement borrowed from the employment discrimination field involving
racial minorities and women, employers are no longer free to act on unproven assumptions
that individuals with certain handicaps cannot perform particular jobs. J. NoRTHRup, supra
note 27, at 81-82. They must be able to produce medical and perhaps industrial production
evidence to this effect. Id. This validation requirement, however, assumes an objectivity
which may be suitable to physical disabilities but which may have serious implications for
placing employees in jobs in accordance with psychological considerations. Id. To date, the
issue remains unresolved as to the propriety of administering mental tests to mentally handi-
capped persons or establishing that a certain personality is compatible with, and therefore
required for, a specific job. Id. at 90-91.
512 See generally Guy, supra note 32, at 245-67; Long, Protecting the Handicapped from
Employment Discrimination: Job-Relatedness and Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Doctrines, Symposium on Employment Rights of the Handicapped, 27 DE PAuL L. REv. 989
(1978).
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"qualified" based on probability. Determining whether a particular
individual is "qualified," therefore, will most likely be limited to an
inquiry as to the individual's present ability to perform adequately
the job sought, unless employment for that job can affirmatively be
shown to result in actual danger to coemployees, the public or him-
self." This, of course, must be done on a case-by-case basis.
The Employer's Obligation to Accommodate
While the handicapped person must be capable of performing
the job in order to be "qualified," he need not be equal to the non-
handicapped individual in his ability to perform. Before disqualify-
ing an individual, the employer has an obligation to consider the
"reasonable accommodations" that could be made for the particu-
lar handicap. 4 Defining "reasonable accommodations," particu-
larly as it relates to the alcoholic, drug addict, or mentally disabled
is perplexing. As with the term "qualified," there are no court deci-
sions or administrative regulations defining this term as it relates
to the troubled employee. "Accommodation," Northrup states,
"requires job structuring when it is 'reasonable' to do so, but no
agency or employer really knows what 'reasonable' means. However,
the employers are still obligated to help make the law work regard-
less of the degree of difficulty, subject to business necessity and
financial limitation, however that may be defined."55
Concern with the scope of the employer's obligation to accom-
modate has focused largely on accommodation to the physically
handicapped, where accommodation is often a physical or architec-
tural matter.56 Indeed, the whole notion of accommodation actually
13 Guy, supra note 32, at 266.
, See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1978); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(k), 85.32(a) (1978).
J. NORTHRUP, supra note 25, at 85. The test to be used in determining appropriate
accommodation is "business necessity and financial limitation." Id. This concept is applied
by the courts in other areas of civil rights litigation where a defendant employer is attempting
to justify a personnel decision that resulted in the alleged discrimination. Under the OFCCP,
HEW, and Executive Order 11,914 regulations, the employer has the burden to demonstrate
that a particular accommodation poses "undue hardship." See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.6(d), -
250.6(d) (1978); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.12, 85.53 (1978). Decisions involving violations of § 504
indicate that this may not be an easy task. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
99 S. Ct. 2361, 2370 (1979); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977). See
also Crawford v. University of N. Carolina, 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977). Although
this trend has been suggested to mean that the reasonableness of the accommodation foreseen
will be judged not from the employer's viewpoint, but from the perspective of the handi-
capped applicant, J. NORTHRUP, supra note 25, at 99, the Davis Court's decision apparently
defines the reasonableness of accommodation as turning on the "substantiality" of the modi-
fication. See note 46 supra.
1' The nature of the accommodation duty is set out in detail in the regulations. See 41
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may be more appropriate to the physically handicapped than to the
mentally-disabled, alcoholic, or drug-addicted individual. Embod-
ied within the spirit of the Act, however, is the notion that accom-
modation includes such considerations as job restructuring and
modified work rescheduling. 57 One may surmise that an employer
will have to accommodate a troubled employee's reasonable rehabil-
itation requirements, such as giving the employee leave to go to a
rehabilitation program or to take medicine. 8 The employer may be
required to transfer the troubled employee who cannot cope with a
particular position to a less stress-producing position if it is avail-
able.59 There may be situations where some form of accommodation
could permit a mentally disabled employee to perform a job which,
at first glance, he may not seem capable of doing. It is clear that
flexible and novel approaches will be nesessary. The degree to which
this must be done will become apparent as the agencies act on a
case-by-case basis.
Finally, while the employer's obligation to "accommodate" be-
fore disqualifying an individual as incapable of performing the job
does not require him to institute and maintain a well-run occupa-
tional rehabilitation program, it has been argued that the employer
who does so may be more able to demonstrate compliance with his
statutory obligations towards the troubled employee whom he is
seeking to discharge."
C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1978); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.12, 85.53 (1978). The HEW regulations state that
"[r]easonable accommodation may include: (1) making facilities used by employees readily
accessible to and usable by handicapped persons, and (2) job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, the provision
of readers or interpreters, and other similar actions." Id. § 84.12(b).
51 Clearly, the granting of time off to attend a program or to take medicine would not
conflict with the substantial limitation set forth by the Supreme Court in Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979), since the accommodation would not result
in burdensome expense. See also Gittler, Fair Employment and the Handicapped: A Legal
Perspective, 27 DE PAUL L. RaV. 953, 960 n.21 (1978).
11 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b)(2) (1978). This proposition is considerably buttressed by the
HEW and Executive Order 11,914 regulations defining "'qualified" as requiring the capability
of performing with reasonable accommodation only the "essentials" of the job in question.
Id. §§ 84.3(k)(1), 85.32(a).
11 With respect to mental illness, making the job placement dependent on psychological
factors is a possibility. In such a case, a paranoid applicant, for example, after being rejected
for a particular team job, may be offered a position more suited to his mental orientation.
One conciliation agreement appears to presage this alternative. J. NORTHRUP, supra note 25,
at 92, see Holland v. Boeing Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 975 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1976), aff'd
en banc, 90 Wash. 2d 384, 583 P.2d 621 (1978).
11 Conversation with Dr. Paul Sherman, past president of the Ass'n of Labor Mgt. Ad-
ministrators and Consultants on Alcoholism (March 1979).
1979]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
STATE LAWS AND THE TROUBLED EMPLOYEE
Thirty-seven states currently have laws prohibiting discrimina-
tion against employees and applicants on the basis of "handicap"
or "disability." 6' A few of these statutes, however, limit the coverage
11 ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (Supp. 1979); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1420(a)(1), 1432.5 (West
Cum. Supp. 1979); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-34-306 (Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-1f, 31-
126(a)-(c) (1979) (amended by Public Act No. 79-480, eff. Oct. 1, 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN §
413.08(3) (West 1973); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 89-1701(g),(h), -1703 (Supp. 1978); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 378-1(7), -2 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 65-22, -23 (Smith-Hurd 1977); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1-2(a)(b), -3(q), -13 (Bums Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601A.2(11),
.6(1)(West 1975); KAN. STAT. §§ 44-10020), -1009 (Supp. 1978); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 207.130(2),
.150 (1977); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4553(7-A), 4572, 4573(4) (1979); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 49B, §§ 14, 15(g) (.16) (1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24K (Michie/Law Co-op 1976);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.550(103)(b), (202) (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(1) (West Supp.
1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-6-15 (Supp. 1978); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 64-305(13), -306,
-307(1) (Supp. 1977); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 613.330, .350(1)(2) (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
354-A:3(13), -A:8(I)-(I) (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §10:5-4.1, -5(q), -12(a) to (e) (West
1976 & Supp. 1979-1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-7.(A)-(H) (1978); N.Y. Exec. LAw §
292(21), 296(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. 128-15.3 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 4112.01(M), .02 (Page Supp. 1978); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 659.400(2), .425 (1977);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 954(p), 955 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-6(H),
-7 (Supp. 1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 3-6A-15 (1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4131
(Supp. 1978); Tx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4419e, §§ 1, 2(a)(4), 3(f, (g) (Vernon 1976 &
Supp. 1978-1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 498 (1978); VA. CODE § 40.1-28.7 (1976); WASH.
REV. CODE § 49.60.180 (1976); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(s), 11-9 (1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
111.32(5)(a), (f) (West Supp. 1979-1980).
That the majority of these statutes were enacted within the last decade is evidence of a
sharp departure from the long history of state indifference to the employment rights of the
handicapped. Prior to the late 1960's, except for a few sporadic, although significant efforts,
see authorities cited in Guy, supra note 32, at 185 n.3, handicapped individuals were denied
state legislative protection. See generally F. KoEsTLE , THE UNSEEN MINoRrry: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF BLINDNESS IN AMERICA (1976); Actenberg, Law and the Physically Disabled: An
Update with Constitutional Implications, 8 S. L. REv. 847 (1976). With recent awakening and
organizing of the handicapped into an influential advocating body, public, legislative and
judicial attitudes of indifference began to change. Guy, supra note 32, at 185. Apparently,
the expansive federal policy of recognition and protection of the employment rights of the
handicapped was, and continues to be, a persuasive influence for change at the state level.
For example, a number of administrative agencies empowered to enforce state fair employ-
ment laws are following the lead of the OFCCP and HEW. See notes 70-72 and accompanying
text infra.
Obligatory federal policies such as affirmative action and mandatory accomodation,
however, have been given statutory treatment only by a few states. Compare CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1431(a), (b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) and ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 854 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1979) and ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 784 (1979) and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 16.765 (West Supp.
1979-1980) (affirmative action-state contractors) with COL. REv. STAT. § 24-34-306(1)(a)
(Supp. 1978) and MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.1202(f), (g), .1207 (Supp. 1979-1980) (reason-
able accomodation). Moreover, only a handful of states provide for a private right of action
for handicap discrimination. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.10.020(c), 18.80.145 (1979); ME.
REv. STAT. tit. 5, §§ 4621-4623 (1979); N.Y. Exec. LAw § 297(9) (McKinney Pam. 1978); PA.




to the physically disabled"2 or mentally retarded.13 The majority of
the relevant statutes prohibit discrimination on the basis of
"handicaps" either without defining this term64 or by broadly defin-
ing "handicaps" to encompass emotional illness and possibly alco-
holism and drug addiction."
62 COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-34-306 (Supp. 1978); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 378-1(7), -2 (1976);
KAN. STAT. §§ 44-1002(j), -1009 (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 149, § 24K (West
Supp. 1979); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-6-15 (Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5 to 6(H), -7
(Supp. 1978); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 3-6A-15 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 498 (1978);
VA. CODE § 40.1-28.7 (1976).
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.550(103)(b), (d) (1977); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4419e §
2(a)(4) (Vernon 1976).
11 See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (Supp. 1979); NEv. REv. STAT. § 613.330, .350(1)-(2)
(1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3(13), -A:8(I)-(II) (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-
4131 (Supp. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 498 (1978); VA. CODE § 40.1-28.7 (1976); WASH.
REv. CODE § 49.60.180 (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(5)(a), (f) (West Supp. 1979-1980).
Where definition of the term is not provided, it seems clear that "handicap" will be
defined on a case-by-case basis by court decisions, see, e.g., State v. Turner, 3 Ohio App. 2d
5, 209 N.E.2d 475 (1965); Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 116 R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976);
Providence Journal Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n on Human Rights, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
168 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1975); Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. v. Washington Human
Rights Comm'n, 87 Wash. 2d 802, 557 P.2d 307 (1976); note 68 infra, or administrative
regulations, see notes 70-74 and accompanying text infra.
61 E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1413.1(d) (West Supp. 1979) ("loss of function or coordination,
or any other health impairment which requires special education or related services"); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-1(f) (West Supp. 1979) ("impairment [either] congenital or resulting
from bodily injury, organic processes or changes or from illness"); IOWA CODE ANN. §
601A.2(11) (West 1975) ("physical or mental condition . ., which constitutes a substantial
handicap"); Ky. REv. STAT. § 207.130(2) (1977) ("a substantial disability. . . demonstrable
by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques"); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 4553(7-A) (West Supp. 1979) ("disability [or] infirmity . ., as determined by a
physician, or, in the case of a mental handicap, by a psychiatrist or psychologist, as well as
any other health or sensory impairment which requires special education, vocational rehabili-
tation or related services"); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 37.1103(b) (West Supp. 1979-1980)
("determinable physical or mental characteristic . . . from disease, injury, congenital condi-
tion of birth, or functional disorder"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West Supp. 1979) ("any
mental, psychological or developmental disability"); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 292(21) (McKinuey
Pam. 1978) ("a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiol-
ogical or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or
is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques"); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954 (1978) (adopting verbatim § 7(6) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
The inclusion of alcoholism or drug addiction within the definition of these statutes is
properly left to the appropriate commissions as complaints arise. What is suggested here is
that the individual state's position on this issue might be guided by other statutes which deal
with alcoholism in other fields. The use of such collateral statutes is permitted where the
meaning of words, such as the broad terms in the above statutes, is unclear or ambiguous.
District of Columbia v. Orleans, 406 F.2d 957, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (use of Uniform Gift to
Minors Act applicable to determination of state tax due on conveyance of real property). Such
construction was utilized by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in defining "handicap" according
to either its common meaning or according to the broader definition of handicap as found in
the Wisconsin Rehabilitative Law. See Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. v. De-
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Although the applicability of these broadly drawn statutes to
emotional or mental illness has not been an issue,"6 the question
of whether alcoholism and drug abuse are "handicaps" under state
statutes has arisen in several states.67 To date, only the Wisconsin
partment in Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 62 Wis.2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443, 446 (1974)
(citing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 55.01(3)(a) (current version at Wis. STAT. ANN. 47.40(3)(a)(West
1979))).
With such an approach, an alcoholic or drug addict in Washington might employ a
statute which was passed to protect disadvantaged persons from involuntary commitment
and which analogized alcoholism and drug addiction to mental deficiencies, epilepsy, and
mental retardation. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.040 (Supp. 1978).
Similarly, Florida recognizes alcoholism as a disease requiring treatment of the alcoholic
as a patient, not a social problem. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 396.022 (West 1973).
Another area of legislation which makes reference to alcoholism and might possibly be
used for guidance is the state disability insurance laws. The ability of insurance carriers to
segregate alcoholics from group insurance plans is derived from statutory provisions. Certain
states require that insurance carriers issuing group disability insurance must offer coverage
for inpatient treatment of alcoholism and drug abuse to the insured. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. §
304.18-130 (Supp. 1978); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3609 (Supp. 1979-1980); NEv. REV.
STAT. §§ 689A.030(9), .047 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27-46.1 (West 1979); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 743.557 (1977); Wis. STAT. § 632.89(2)(a)(1) (1979). In view of these statutes, it would
appear that the legislatures consider alcoholism as a disability and therefore, to be consistent,
should treat it as such for the purpose of its employment discrimination laws. If not so
treated, the legislature would be creating the anomaly whereby an employer could offer his
worker coverage for expenses arising from alcoholism, while at the same time discriminate
against another alcoholic by firing or refusing to hire him. It should be noted, however, that
a majority of states provide in, their insurance laws an option for the insurance carriers to
exculpate themselves from any liability on claims arising from alcohol or drug related ill-
nesses.
It should also be noted that the trend in most states is to incorporate alcoholism as part
of their mental health codes and recognize it as a disease. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 80-2708 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ORE. REV. STAT. § 430.315 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §
33.802 (1977). Additionally, the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300u (1976)), requires
states, in order to receive federal grants, to coordinate alcoholism services planning with
general medical services planning, as well as with mental hygiene services. For a medical
discussion of alcoholism as a mental illness, see Freed, Some Interfaces Between Alcoholism
and Mental Health, 6 J. DRUG IssuEs 213 (1976).
" Emotional illness has never been segregated by handicap discrimination laws because
of the difficulty in ascribing a definition to such a term, and generally, it has been subsumed
under the broad term "mental illness." The Council of State Governments, in a recently
published recommendation of treatment for the mentally disturbed, see COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, STATE RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE MENTALLY DISABLED (1976), divided such a
handicap into two areas: (1) mentally ill, and (2) mentally retarded. Acknowledging the
impossibility of defining the former, the Council settled upon a description which encom-
passed all persons experiencing serious problems in adjusting to life and who are subjected
to "continuous or periodic episodes of depression, acute anxiety, personality disorders, psy-
chosis, problems relating to others, etc." Id. at 6. These types of emotional illnesses (referred
to as mental illnesses throughout this article) also would fit into the description of mental
illness as found in the statutes listed in note 65 supra.
"7 Because most of the statutes have been enacted only recently, very few cases have been
entertained by the state judiciary or administrative agencies. Although only one state court
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judiciary has held alcoholism to be a "handicap" within the mean-
ing of their employment discrimination statute.1
There are, however, indications that administrative agencies
charged with enforcing broadly drawn state employment discrimi-
nation statutes are beginning to confront the question of whether
alcoholism and drug abuse -are to be covered. A recent survey of
twenty such agencies69 indicates that only one state has officially
adopted the view that alcoholism and drug addiction are protected
handicaps7 whereas five have done so unofficially. 71 Of the remain-
has held that alcoholism is a "handicap" within the meaning of its fair employment act, see
note 68 and accompanying text infra, the administrative agencies charged with enforcement
of these statutes have been actively debating the status of alcoholic and drug addicted
employees and applicants. See note 69 infra.
11 Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Department of Indus., Lab. & Human Relations, 13
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1811 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976). In Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., the court,
in ordering the reinstatement of an employee who had been discharged after his employer
learned of his alcoholism, stated that:
There is no question that alcoholism or "drinking problems" can operate to
make achievement unusually difficult. Knowledge that a person has such a history
may interfere with getting new jobs or obtaining promotions, even if the person is
no longer drinking. As with many other illnesses, employers' ignorance of the dis-
ease or fears of potential future problems may result in discrimination completely
unrelated to an employe's [sic] actual ability to perform on the job. The legislative
policy of full employment for all qualified persons would thereby be impeded.
Id. at 1812. In deciding to broadly construe the term "handicap," the court relied on prior
Wisconsin cases which had interpreted "handicap" to include disabilities such as deviated
septums, Journal Co. v. Department of Indus., Lab. & Human Relations, 13 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1655 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976), and asthma and migraine headaches, Chicago, Milwaukee,
St. Paul & Pac. R.R. v. Department of Indus., Lab. & Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215
N.W.2d 443 (1974). The underlying philosophy of the Wisconsin judiciary was succinctly
stated by one court which, in rejecting appellant's contention that to be deemed handicapped
one must "be incapacitated from normal remunerative occupation, [be] an economic detri-
ment to the normal emplcyer," and be in need of "rehabilitative training," declared:
The Wisconsin Fair Employment Code was promulgated so as to encourage and
foster to the fullest extent practicable the employment of all properly qualified
persons. . . . If the individual can function efficiently on the job, then the mere
fact that he is different from the average employee as to those statutorily proscribed
bases may not be used as a basis for discrimination.
Id. at 394, 215 N.W.2d at 445.
11 In May and June 1979, the St. John's Law Review conducted an informal telephone
survey of 20 state agencies responsible for the enforcement of employment discrimination
statutes. The purpose of the survey was to determine current attitudes regarding the inclusion
of alcoholism and drug addiction as handicaps. The results are discussed in notes 70-74 and
accompanying text infra and are on file with the St. John's Law Review.
11 Although not yet codified, Illinois has incorporated alcoholism and drug addiction by
way of a Governor's official memorandum.
11 The Michigan Department of Civil Rights has stated that alcoholism and drug addic-
tion are handicaps in response to inquiries from employers, employee groups and the handi-
cap commission, although no formal opinion has been issued and no complaints have been
filed. During the hearing of a complaint which was subsequently settled, the New Jersey
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ing states, some have accepted alcoholism but not drug addiction,7 2
some are currently debating the question,73 and others have not
reached the issue.74 Whatever the ultimate decision reached, it is
apparent that the determination process has been and will continue
to be laborious. The New York experience is illustrative. In response
to guidelines issued by the New York State Division of Human
Rights, the New York Human Rights Law76 was amended in 197417
to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of "disability"
which included, inter alia, "mental conditions. '7 8 The Human
Division of Civil Rights took the position that recovered alcoholics and drug addicts were
protected handicapped persons. The Civil Rights Commission of Ohio, influenced by the
HEW guidelines to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, has informally
indicated that alcoholics and drug addicts fall within the definiton of handicap. In a recent
amendment to its employment discrimination statute, Pub. Act 79-480 (1979) (amending
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-126 (1979)), Connecticut extended protection to those persons with
"present or past history of mental disorder." The Commission of Human Rights and Oppor-
tunities has stated thay they will process complaints of employment discrimination based on
alcoholism or drug addiction, these conditions interpreted as being "mental disorders."
The position taken by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission presents an
enigma. A Commission press release dated June 3, 1975 (on file with the St. John's Law
Review) announced that "impairments which are. . . mental or emotional, including those
which are drug or alcohol-related" would be included within the definition of handicap in the
forthcoming Commission regulations. Nevertheless, the final version of the regulations, PA.
CODE tit. 43, ch. 17 (1978), adopted on August 28, 1978, did not expressly include alcoholism
or drug addiction. Instead, the handicap definition was adopted verbatim from the HEW §
504 regulations. The Commission did indicate, however, that it is prepared to accept the
broadest possible interpretation of the definition and hence alcoholism and drug addiction
will probably be covered.
72 Kansas (unofficial), Montana (official) and Nevada (unofficial) fall within this cate-
gory. The Montana Human Rights Division is currently scheduling a hearing to determine
the status of drug addition.
71 Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Rhode Island and Wyoming have not decided
whether to include alcoholism or drug addiction within the meaning of "handicap." The
Florida commission on Human Relations is currently revising their regulations and plan to
draw from § § 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Georgia Office of Human Affairs
has indicated that attitudes toward drug and alcohol addiction as handicaps are positive, but
that the issue remains unresolved. An amendment to the Washington D.C. statute which
would include alcoholism and drug addiction within the handicap definition has been pro-
posed by the Office of Human Rights, which is optimistic about its passage.
", The question has not been discussed in California, Colorado, Indiana, Maine and
Maryland.
11 State of N.Y. Exec. Dep't State Div. of Human Rights, Memorandum of Law No. 576
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Flynn Act Guidelines].
78 N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972 & Pam. 1978).
77 [1974] N.Y. LAws Ch. 988, § 1 (amending N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292 (McKinney 1972)).
Im N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 292(21) (McKinney Pam. 1978). Disability is defined as follows:
The term "disability" means a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting
from anatomical, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the exer-
cise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical
or laboratory diagnostic techniques, provided, however, that in all provisions of this
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Rights Division, however, did not initially interpret the term
"disability" to include alcoholism and drug abuse; rather, they were
viewed as "social diseases. ' ' 71 Hence, an employer's firing of an em-
ployee or rejection of a job applicant because of prior or current
alcohol or drug abuse was deemed lawful.8 1
Influenced by both interpretations of the Act and the results of
"recent medical and social research," the State Division of Human
Rights subsequently reconsidered the status of alcoholism and offi-
cially revised the definition of "disability" to include the recovered
alcoholic. The drug addict, however, is still regarded as a "social
problem," and therefore, even if recovered, is outside the purview
of the statute.
Since a primary requisite under the New York statute is that
Article dealing with employment, the term shall be limited to. . . conditions which
are unrelated to the ability to engage in the activities involved in the job or occupa-
tion which a person claiming protection of this article shall be seeking.
Id. The Flynn Act Guidelines, issued by the New York State Division of Human Rights,
provide that "a mental impairment within the statutory definition may not be used as a bar
to employment unless it interferes with the person's ability to do the job." Flynn Act Guide-
lines, supra note 75, at § E(ll). In contrast, employers were free to reject employees because
of mental impairment or even a history of mental hospital confinement or psychiatric care
prior to the passage of the Flynn Act. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 290-301 (McKinney 1972 & Pam.
1978).
"1 Flynn Act Guidelines, supra note 75, at § D. The New York State Division of Human
Rights relied on Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), and United States v. Bishop, 469 F.2d
1337 (1st Cir. 1972), in excluding alcoholism and drug addiction from statutory protection.
Powell involved an appeal from conviction for public intoxication and Bishop was an appeal
from the conviction of a heroin addict. In both cases, the defendants raised a defense based
upon the constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment on the theory that
the states were punishing unlawfully individuals with the disease of-alcoholism and drug
addiction. 392 U.S. at 531-37; 469 F.2d at 1346-48. The Supreme Court in Powell character-
ized alcoholism as the principal "social problem" in the country and dismissed the argument
that alcoholism is a disease, noting there was no agreement among the medical profession as
to what it means to say alcoholism is a disease. 392 U.S. at 522-26 (emphasis added). Simi-
larly, the Bishop court concluded that drug addiction was not a disease. 469 F.2d at 1348.
See Flynn Act Guidelines, supra note 75, at § E.
I Tn February 1977, the New York State Division of Human Rights held informative
public hearings on the question of extending protection to the recovering alcoholic. See N.Y.
State Div. of Human Rights News Release WK-2329 (February 16, 1977).
82 See N.Y. Exec. Dep't State Div. of Human Rights, Memorandum of Law No. 803:
Flynn Act Interpretation-Alcohol, September 5, 1978. The Division of Human Rights recog-
nized that although the "nature of alcoholism" has not been resolved, "the preponderance of
medical opinion has concluded that alcoholism is an illness." Id. at 1. The Division further
recognized that there are three stages of alcoholism: the early stage, the middle or crucial
stage and the chronic stage. Id. at 3. Alcoholics in the first two stages are deemed entitled to
more protection under the Flynn Act than those in the chronic stage because "their ability
to perform their job may not be as impaired as the chronic alcoholic." Id. The Division also
distinguished between the "active" and "recovering" alcoholic, the latter defined as one who
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the handicapped employee be able to perform his duties,8 3 an em-
ployer is not acting unlawfully if he fires or refuses to hire an em-
ployee who cannot perform satisfactorily. 84 Consistent with this, the
Division of Human Rights has indicated that the law "does protect
an individual with a disease involving future risk so long as the
disease does not presently interfere with the individual's ability to
perform. '85 The implication is that with respect to the recovered
alcoholic or to the person with a history of mental illness, the em-
ployer cannot consider in his hiring decision any concern he may
have as to the potential of recurrence of the disability."
In summary, although the Act and the regulations promulgated
thereunder have stimulated discussion of extending legislative pro-
tection to recovered alcoholics, drug addicts and the mentally ill, it
apparently will take some time before state protection is actually
afforded. The trend has been to recognize recovered alcoholics and
persons with mental illness histories as "disabled" for purposes of
some statutes;8 7 whether they will be considered legally
"handicapped" for purposes of discrimination laws in most states
remains to be resolved. It is clear, however, that there is resistance
to viewing drug addiction as other than a social problem; as long as
"should be involved in an alcoholism rehabilitation program for six months," with such
period serving only as a guideline, Id. at 3-4. Perhaps the most important aspect of the
Division's decision was their recognition of accomodation.
In order to enforce the anti-discrimination provisions as they apply to alcohol-
ics, it may be necessary for the Division to order respondents to create or upgrade
occupational alcoholism programs. Likewise, alcoholics who file complaints with
the Division of Human Rights may, depending on the facts of the case, be required
to participate in alcoholism rehabilitation programs in order to be permitted to
keep their jobs.
Id. at 5.
8 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(20) (McKinney Pam. 1978); Flynn Act Guidelines, supra
note 75, at 1-4. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 65-23 (Smith-Hurd 1977); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 22-9-1-13(c) (Burns Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. § 44-1006 (1973 & Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 8-4131 (Supp. 1978).
8' The capacity to perform is determined somewhat by the statutory duty an employer
owes to accomodate an employee's handicap. This issue has been put off by the Division of
Human Rights until it acquires a "fund of experience in the course of its administering of
the Flynn Act." Flynn Act Guidelines, supra note 75, at 2. Notwithstanding this uncertainty,
an employer must permit employees to leave their work station to take medicine. Conversa-
tion with Ann Thatcher Anderson, General Counsel, New York State Division of Human
Rights (March 1979).
Rulings on Inquiries, § 15B (published by the Division of Human Rights of New York
as an aid to the interpretation of its Human Rights Law. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKin-
ney 1972)). The ability to perform means the ability to perform over a reasonable period of
time, this time period varying from job to job.
See Flynn Act Guidelines, supra note 75, at 4.
87 See notes 65 & 66 supra.
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this resistance remains, state protection will not be extended to the
recovered drug addict. Moreover, since consideration of reasonable
accomodation is not a factor under state employment laws, the
protection extended will be more limited than that extended by
federal law. For the time being, then, recovered alcoholics, drug
addicts and the mentally disturbed can be discriminated against in
most states without recourse.
ARBITRATION DECISIONS
Having considered the legal constraints on the employer's free-
dom of action by virtue of federal and state law, we will now con-
sider the constraints imposed by arbitrators. Arbitrators have been
called upon to determine whether an employer's decision concerning
an employee with a problem of drug abuse, alcoholism or emotional
illness is violative of the collective bargaining agreement. This de-
termination is made apart from any consideration of whether the
employer also is violating any law.8" In this section, arbitration cases
will be analyzed to assess how arbitrators review employers' deci-
sions. 9 Of particular interest is the question of whether arbitrators
tend to apply different standards where a troubled employee is in-
volved than in the case of a non-troubled employee and, further,
whether arbitrators apply the same standard to all troubled employ-
ees or whether they treat alcoholics differently from the drug abuser
or the mentally disabled.
Most cases involve challenges to management's discipline or
discharge of the employee." Typically, the union charges that man-
agement's decision to discharge or discipline an employee was with-
u The arbitrator's authority is generally limited to determining whether the employer
has correctly applied the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Normally, a
collective bargaining agreement is silent with respect to an employer's initial hiring of em-
ployees, and predictably, one sees no arbitration cases challenging an employer's rejection of
a job applicant. Once hired, however, the employee's terms and conditions of employment
are governed by the collective bargaining agreement.
11 There are numerous cases dealing with discipline of employees for violating rules with
respect to drinking on the job or selling drugs on or off the job. Other than the extent to which
employees are actually viewed as drug addicts or abusers, or alcoholics or both, such cases
are not within the scope of this Article.
11 Of course, troubled employees may be adversely affected in other ways, as, for exam-
ple, by demotion, transfer, layoff, or denial of promotion. The focus in this Article is primarily
on discharge or discipline.
There are also a number of cases involving an employer's refusal to reinstate an employee
who has been incapacitated by mental illness. Since a refusal to reinstate may, as a practical
matter, have the effect of a discharge, albeit non-disciplinary, these cases also are considered
in this paper. See notes 105-116 and accompanying text infra.
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out just cause and hence was in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement.' The issue usually placed before the arbitrator will be:
"Was the discharge/suspension of X for just cause and if not, what
shall the remedy be?"
Discharge Because of Problem Alone or Problem-Caused Behavior
Away from the Job
Initially, one must ask whether an employer ever has "just
cause" to discharge an mployee solely because of his problem of
drug abuse, alcoholism or mental disorder."2 Generally, the answer
is no. The basic view is that the employee's behavior away from his
job is his own business93 and that "the employer does not [because
of the employment relationship] become guardian of the em-
ployee's every personal action and does not exercise parental con-
trol."94 Thus, if the employer discovers that an employee padlocks
his apartment to prevent a Communist Party invasion, or drinks or
takes drugs to excess every weekend, the employer has no justifica-
tion for discharging that employee. 5 Naturally, the same principle
" Normally, the collective bargaining agreement will provide, in substance, that an
employee may not be disciplined or discharged by an employer without "just cause." F.
ELKoui & E. ELKOuRI, How ARBTRATION WoRs 612-13 (3d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
ELKouRi & ELKOURI].
11 This determination is made apart from legal considerations which would limit the
freedom of action of an employer covered by the applicable federal or state discrimination
laws.
g3 Pioneer Gen-E-Motors Corp., 3 Lab. Arb. 486, 488 (1946) (Blair, Arb.).
Inland Container Corp., 28 Lab. Arb. 312, 314 (1957) (Ferguson, Arb.) (dictum). In
Pioneer Gen-E-Motors Corp., 3 Lab. Arb. 486, 488 (1946) (Blair, Arb.), an assault of a
supervisor off company property and after working hours was held not to be cause for dis-
charge. "To hold otherwise would, in effect, be to extend company or employer supervision
over the private lives of their employees. Just as the authority of the employer would be
extended, so, also, would his responsibility. Would such a responsibility be desired? The
answer is obvious." Id. See also W.E. Caldwell Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 434, 436-37 (1957) (Kessel-
man, Arb.). In Greenlee Bros. & Co., 67 Lab. Arb. 847 (1976) (Wolff, Arb.), it was stated that:
[t]he overriding issue is whether the grievant's alcholism has manifested itself in
relation to his work performance and attendance to a degree justifying his dis-
charge. Alcoholism, like any other disease, is not a per se basis for discharge ...
An employer can have no legitimate complaint about an employee who drinks
excessively at home but who is able to report to work regularly and perform up to
standards. Thus, the critical issue is not the degree of grievant's drinking, but the
degree of his absenteeism and the quality of his work performance.
Id. at 854 (footnote omitted).
" E.g., Greenlee Bros. & Co., 67 Lab. Arb. 847, 854 (1976) (Wolff, Arb.) (alcoholism);
Movielab, Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. 632 (1968) (McMahon, Arb.) (narcotics conviction for off-plant
conduct); W.E. Caldwell Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 434, 436-37 (1957) (Kesselman, Arb.) (intoxica-
tion); see Midwest Tel. Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 311, 316-17 (1976) (Witney, Arb.) (neurosis);
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 242, 244 (1964) (Duff, Arb.) (no relationship between
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would prevent an employer's taking disciplinary action against a
now-recovered employee upon learning that he had previously been
"troubled.""6
While it is generally true that the employee's behavior away
from his job is not a legitimate concern of his employer, 7 it is also
true that the employer does have a legitimate concern when this
behavior adversely affects the business. For example, the other
employees may fear the troubled employee and be unwilling to work
with him,99 or the company's reputation for safety or for the reliabil-
offense and status as employee); Foundry Equip. Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 333 (1957) (Vokoun, Arb.)
(confinement to mental hospital); International Harvester Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 229 (1955) (Cole,
Arb.). (sexual irregularity). But see Eastern Airlines, Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 932 (1965) (Ables,
Arb.).
Cf. Alcas Cutlery Corp., 38 Lab. Arb. 297, 299 (1962) (Guthrie, Arb.) (reinstatement).
'7 These general rules evolved in cases concerning untroubled employees but are equally
applicable to the troubled employee. See, e.g., Alcas Cutlery Corp., 38 Lab. Arb. 297, 299-
300 (1962) (Guthrie, Arb.).
,1 Inland Container Corp., 28 Lab. Arb. 312, 314 (1957) (Ferguson, Arb.); ExzouI &
ELKouRi, supra note 91, at 616-17. In W.E. Caldwell Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 434 (1957) (Kesselman,
Arb.), Arbitrator Kesselman outlined the reasoning underlying this rule:
The Arbitrator finds no basis in the contract or in American industrial practice
to justify a discharge for misconduct away from the place of work unless:
1) behavior harms Company's reputation or product ....
2) behavior renders employee unable to perform his duties or appear at work,
in which case the discharge would be based on inefficiency or excessive absentee-
ism. . . . or
3) behavior leads to refusal, reluctance or inability of other employees to work
with him.
Id. at 436-37.
The arbitrator may rely on the existence of a safety hazard, recognizing that the employer
must provide a safe place to work. See Green River Steel Corp., 49 Lab. Arb. 117, 120 (1967)
(Chalfie, Arb.) (alcoholism); Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 891, 893 (1961) (Duff,
Arb.) (cocaine addiction potential hazard); cf. Albritton Eng'r Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. 857 (1966)
(Hughes, Arb.) (off-premises tendency to violence).
11 In Alabama Power Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 220 (1976) (Caraway, Arb.), an intoxicated em-
ployee, C, murdered another individual during non-working hours off the premises. The
employer fired the employee, citing as his reason that the employees would be afraid to work
with C and the operation would suffer. Rejecting this argument, the arbitrator found that
the employees had no fear of C and that the murder was in self-defense. Id. at 223-24. In Herr-
Voss Corp., 70 Lab. Arb. 497 (1978) (Sherman, Arb.), the arbitrator noted the reasonableness
of the employer's objections to the reinstatement of a mentally ill employee who had been
violent but held that this did not warrant termination of his seniority. See also Robertshaw
Controls Co., 64-2 ARB 8748 (1964) (Duff, Arb.). Although upholding a discharge in
Robertshaw Controls Co., Arbitrator Duff expressed some reservations:
Arbitrators are reluctant to sustain discharges based on off-duty conduct of
employees unless a direct relationship between off-duty conduct and employment
is proved. Discretion must be exercised, lest employers become censors of com-
munity morals. However, where socially reprehensible conduct and employment
duties and risks are substantially related, conviction for certain types of crimes may
justify discharge.
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ity of its product may be harmed by the continued employment of
a troubled individual who has engaged in a violent act. In these
circumstances, the fear by customers is frequently raised.100
Although these employer concerns are of great weight, it must
be emphasized that a mere surmise that the employee will not per-
form properly on the job,101 that employees will not work with him,'
or that the company's reputation will be hurt will not be enough.0 3
The actual connection between the employee's off-the-premises
behavior and harm to the company's reputation or operation must
be established to the satisfaction of the arbitrator.104 There are, no
doubt, many troubled individuals whose disorders and conduct
Id. at 4 (quoting Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 891, 893 (1961) (Duff, Arb.)).
Another consideration in denying reinstatement is the adverse impact on the authority of
supervisors if the now rehabilitated troubled employee returns to work. NCR Appleton Papers
Div., 70 Lab. Arb. 756, 759 (1978) (Gundermann, Arb.).
The discussion here is limited to cases involving potential fears or concerns of fellow
employees or supervisory staff. The question of management's rights to terminate the employ-
ment relationship where the employee would pose an actual safety hazard to persons or
property is discussed at notes 98 supra & notes 101-104, 106 infra and accompanying text.
"® See generally Alabama Power Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 220, 224 (1976) (Caraway, Arb.); W.E.
Caldwell Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 434, 436-37 (1957) (Kesselman, Arb.).
"I See Midwest Tel. Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 311, 316-17 (1976) (Witney, Arb.); note 98 supra.
102 See Herr-Voss Corp., 70 Lab. Arb. 497, 499-500 (1978) (Sherman, Arb.); Alabama
Power Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 220 (1976) (Caraway, Arb.); Kentile Floors Inc., 57 Lab. Arb. 919
(1971) (Block, Arb.) (narcotics possession).
"I See ELKOURI & Erxoum, supra note 91, at 617, and cases cited therein. See also W.E.
Caldwell Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 434, 437 (1957); (Kesselman, Arb.) ("The charge that [the em-
ployee's] experience might start a 'bad tendency' among the other employees is merely
hypothetical and cannot be taken seriously without proof.").
101 As discussed by Arbitrator Ferguson:
The connection between the facts which occur and the extent to which the
business is affected must be reasonable and discernible. They must be such as could
logically be expected to cause some result in the employer's affairs. Each case must
be measured on its own merits.
Inland Container Corp., 28 Lab. Arb. 312, 314 (1957) (Ferguson, Arb.). Even where the
employer has discharged an employee for sale or use of drugs off the premises, he generally
must show some "drug problem" in the plant, some other adverse effect on the company's
operation or business that will result from the employee's wrongdoing, or some adverse effect
on the employee's work performance. See Kentile Floors, Inc., 57 Lab. Arb. 919, 922 (1971)
(Block, Arb.); Movielab Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. 632, 633 (1968) (McMahon, Arb.); Linde Co., 37
Lab. Arb. 1040, 1042-43 (1962) (Wyckoff, Arb.). The degree of proof of "adverse effect" may
differ depending on the type of conduct involved. Where arrest or conviction was for the sale
or possession of hard drugs or for the sale of soft drugs, the employer may only have to
establish probable adverse effect. Where the arrest or conviction was for possession of soft
drugs, arbitrators may require specific evidence of adverse effect or of a drug problem. Wynns,
Arbitration Standards in Drug Discharge Cases, 34 ARB. J. 19, 21-22 (1979); see Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 60 Lab. Arb. 502 (1973) (Duff, Arb.); Ward School Bus Mfg., 60
Lab. Arb. 183 (1973) (Wagner, Arb.); Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 891 (1961)
(Duff, Arb.).
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away from the plant constitute no threat to anyone's safety and bear
no relationship to their employment. The alcoholic can rarely be
said to create fear among fellow employees and his problem and
conduct away from the plant will have an impact on the company's
reputation only in rare instances. An example would be where the
employee operates a vehicle or machine and confidence in the safety
of the operation is crucial. Even here, unless the employee in mani-
festing his problem off the premises is identified with the company
in some way, for example, by his uniform, it may be difficult to
prove adverse impact on the company's reputation.
Refusal to Reinstate Because of Problem of Alcoholism, Drug
Addiction or Mental Disorder
A variation on the theme of the employee discharged merely
because of his problem is that of the formerly disabled employee
who is denied reinstatement from a leave of absence because of his
problem.1 15 Here we have an individual whose work performance,
when he was disabled, was admittedly impaired. When the em-
ployer refuses reinstatement, however, he has no record to present
to the arbitrator showing current impairment in the employee's job
performance as a result of the "problem." Rather the employer asks
the arbitrator to agree with his prediction that, if reinstated, the
employee's work will be impaired or, in other words, that he will be
unable to perform the job.
To be sure, the current ability of the employee to perform the
work is a legitimate concern of the employer. Clearly, where it is
satisfactorily established that the employee will not be able to per-
form the job, or that he would be a safety hazard to himself or others
if returned to work, the refusal to reinstate will be upheld."6
Resolution of the question of the employee's fitness to return to
work, however, often must be made in the face of conflicting medi-
cal opinion. The employee generally produces letters from his per-
sonal doctor stating that he is ready to resume work, and the com-
pany produces its doctor disagreeing. In some cases, the arbitrator
will sustain the employer's right to rely on the advice of its chosen
'u Since the contract may have a time limit on the duration of sick leave or leave of
absence, refusal to reinstate, for all practical purposes, may have the effect of a discharge.
See Ashtabula Bow Socket Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 377, 382 (1965) (Dworkin, Arb.).
Im See, e.g., United States Steel Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. 545, 548 (1966) (Rock, Arb.); cf.
Ashtabula Bow Socket Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 377, 383 (1965) (Dworkin, Arb.) (refusal to recall
upheld but employee's condition could change making him eligible for recall).
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medical expert.1 7 In others, the arbitrator undertakes to weigh the
conflicting medical testimony.' 8 Recently, some arbitrators have
given the benefit of the doubt to those doctors who testify that the
employee may resume work.' 9 Still other arbitrators will urge the
parties to seek another opinion from a mutually agreed upon psychi-
atrist and will find that opinion decisive."10
Another situation-with implications for the recovered alco-
holic and drug addict-involves the mentally ill in a state of remis-
sion. Here the employer may concede that the employee is currently
able to do the job but claims that the employee may have a relapse
in the future and be unable to work. In one case, for example,'" the
employee who sought reinstatement had been on disability leave for
almost 5 years because of his mental illness. He was fit to return to
work but even his own psychiatrist conceded that he was in a state
of remission and might have a relapse at any time. The employer
refused reinstatement, arguing that he had a right to expect reason-
able longevity from his employees. In ordering reinstatement, how-
ever, the arbitrator emphasized that the employer's legitimate con-
cern was the ability of the employee to work and rejected the notion
that the employer had a right to expect indefinite performance from
his employees." 2 This is consistent with the insistence by most arbi-
trators in discharge cases that the critical factor is current work
impairment and not potential for impairment in the future.
One problem in reinstating an employee who may not be able
to perform either immediately, if the arbitrator errs in assessing his
current ability, or in the future, due to relapse, is the cost to the
employer. It is not enough merely to say that the employer will be
able to discharge the employee when he becomes unable to work.
The employer may fear accident, with its attendant workmen's
compensation problems, excessive use of sick leave, and renewal of
disability leave."'
Arbitrators are not unaware of these and other more subtle
"° See Maremont Automotive Prods., Inc., 37 Lab. Arb. 175 (1961) (Kelliher, Arb.). The
expert's advice, however, must not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. ELKOUm & EL-
KOURI, supra note 91, at 292.
101 See ELKouRi & ELKOUm, supra note 91, at 293.
' See, e.g., City of Hartford, 69 Lab. Arb. 303, 307 (1977) (Mallon, Arb.).
"I See, e.g., United States Steel Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. 545, 548 (1966) (Rock, Arb.); Dayton
Malleable Iron Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 959, 960 (1964) (Stouffer, Arb.).
" National Steel Corp., 66 Lab. Arb. 533 (1976) (Traynor, Arb.).
2 Id. at 538. See Ashtabula Bow Socket Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 377 (1965) (Dworkin, Arb.);
45 Lab. Arb. 384, 387 (1965) (Dworkin, Arb.) (supplemental opinion); Dayton Malleable Iron
Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 959, 963 (1964) (Stouffer, Arb.).
"I See, e.g., National Steel Corp., 66 Lab. Arb. 533 (1976) (Traynor, Arb.).
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concerns of the employer. Usually, however, the arguments in favor
of reinstatement are eloquent, because balanced against the risk of
costs to the employer is the risk that the employee's rehabilitation
may be seriously retarded or halted if he cannot work, to say nothing
of his ability to obtain employment elsewhere."' While the arbitra-
tor often reinstates the employee outright, occasionally there is
some accommodation to the problem of the employer's potential
liability. For example, reinstatement may be subject to satisfactory
performance during a trial period"' or the right of employers to
examine the employee periodically. " '
Discharge for Cause
Since the employer normally cannot discharge the troubled
employee because of his problem alone, for what reasons may he
discharge him? As has been discussed, it is generally accepted that
an employer is permitted to expect an employee to perform his job
satisfactorily and to abide by reasonable work rules. Conversely,
when the employee fails to live up to his side of the bargain, either
because job performance is impaired or rules are not followed, the
employer need not continue to employ him.1 7
Predictably, since mental disorder, drug addiction or alcohol-
ism standing alone are not grounds for discharge, the discharge of
the troubled employee will be based on a cause which is not unique
"I In Philco Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 568 (1964) (Davis, Arb.), the arbitrator, in reversing the
discharge of an employee based, inter alia, on the company's fears that the employee would
have a relapse or inight engage in violence, stated: "If his own past employer is not obligated
to offer the grievant an opportunity to continue to support himself, who else in the community
can be expected to permit him a chance to continue to survive economically?" Id. at 569.
HI E.g., National Steel Corp., 66 Lab. Arb. 533 (1976) (Traynor, Arb.) (six-month trial
period); see Ashtabula Bow Socket Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 384 (1965) (Dworkin, Arb.) (supplemen-
tal opinion).
,0 Dayton Malleable Iron Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 959 (1964) (Stouffer, Arb.).
"7 See ELKoum & ELKouRi, supra note 91, at 612 (quoting Arbitrator McGoldrich in
Worthington Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 1, 6-7 (1955) (McGoldrich, Arb.)). See also notes 1-2 and
accompanying text supra.
So basic is this notion that those pressing on employers a legal obligation not to discrimi-
nate on the basis of mental disorder, alcoholism or drug addiction have attempted to reassure
them that such an obligation exists only where the employee can perform the job. See notes
106, 111 & 112 and accompanying text supra. This obligation is subject, of course, to the duty
"to accommodate," which, as discussed, raises some questions about the employer's ability
to apply the same standards to the troubled employee as he would to the non-troubled
employee.
Of course, principles of progressive discipline, see notes 128-131 and accompanying text
infra, require that the employee be given an opportunity to correct his deficiencies before the
ultimate penalty of discharge is imposed.
1979]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:659
to the troubled employee,"' for example, assault on a foreman or
chronic absenteeism. The cause for discharge nevertheless may be
related to his "problem" and more common to the troubled em-
ployee than to the normal employee, as, for example, bringing intox-
icating beverages or drugs into the plant, drinking or taking drugs
on the job or being under the influence of drugs or alcohol on the
job.1 Occasionally, the employee's troubles are so intertwined with
his job performance that it is difficult to separate them, as when the
alcoholic is essentially incapacitated. In all cases, however, it is the
employee's inability to perform a proper day's work or his miscon-
duct that the employer should, and generally does, rely on.
As previously stated, unions typically charge in discharge cases
that there was no just cause for the discipline or discharge. Certain
standards generally are applied by the arbitrator to determine
whether there is merit to this claim. A question arises whether these
generally applicable standards apply where a troubled employee is
involved.
Although arbitrators do not always speak in terms of burdens
of proof, it is generally agreed that in discharge cases, the employer
has the burden of proving that there was just cause for discharge. 120
"I The Trice-Belasco study revealed that a majority of the troubled employees reinstated
were discharged after a dramatic incident provoked the supervisor's action. They concluded
that, in general, supervisors are more likely to impose discipline where there is overt dramatic
misbehavior than where there is a continual pattern of subtle misbehavior which is easier to
tolerate. H. TmicE & J. B.LASCO, supra note 2, at 19. See also Greenlee Bros. & Co., 67 Lab.
Arb. 847 (1976) (Wolff, Arb.); Thrifty Drug Stores Co., 56 Lab. Arb. 789 (1971) (Peters, Arb.);
Philco Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 568 (1964) (Davis, Arb.).
Employers discipline or discharge employees for many reasons, among them absentee-
ism, tardiness, loafing, early quitting, sleeping on the job, assault and fighting among employ-
ees, horseplay, insubordination, threat or assault of a management representative, abusive
language to supervisors, profane or abusive language to others, falsifying company records,
falsifying of employment applications, dishonesty, theft, disloyalty to government (security
risk), disloyalty to employer, "moonlighting," negligence, damage to or loss of machine or
materials, incompetence or low productivity, refusal to accept a job assignment, refusal to
work overtime, strike misconduct, a prohibited strike or slowdown, obscene or immoral con-
duct, gambling, abusing customers, attachment or garnishment of wages. In addition, an
employee may be discharged or disciplined for violation of rules concerning possession or use
of intoxicants or possession or use of drugs. See ELKoui & ELKOUM, supra note 91, at 651.
III Thus, while one need not be an addict or alcoholic to engage in this sort of misconduct,
e.g., Blue Diamond Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 1136, 1138 (1976) (Summers, Arb.); Mass Transit
Administration v. Amalgamated Transit Union, No. 187-15, slip op. at 5 (Am. Arb. Ass'n
1974) (Strongin, Arb.), the troubled employee is certainly more likely to do so than the non-
troubled one. See, e.g., Eden Hospital, 56 Lab. Arb. 319 (1971) (Eaton, Arb.).
'1 In Hussman Refrigerator Co., 68 Lab. Arb. 565, 569-71 (1977) (Mansfield, Arb.), the
arbitrator discussed the various rationales utilized by arbitrators in justifying the imposition
of burdens of proof. Six rationales were distinguished:
1) since discharge is the most severe penalty an employer can impose, being the
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Thus, the employer must first prove that the employee was guilty
of the wrongdoing and second that the wrongdoing justified the
penalty of discharge121 or that the employer was reasonable in be-
lieving it did so.12
In requiring proof of guilt of wrongdoing, the standards adhered
to by arbitrators where troubled employees are involved appear to
be no different than those that are applied in the case of any em-
ployee. The employer is generally not subject to a lower standard
of proof merely because a troubled employee is involved.'2 Nor does
it appear that employers are held to any higher standard of proof
in the case of a troubled employee. 24 Sometimes it may, however,
equivalent of 'economic capital punishment,' he must bear the burden of justifying
such a serious move; 2) since the reasons for the employer's disciplinary action are
peculiarly within his own knowledge, he must carry the burden of demonstrating
their adequacy, otherwise the employee would be unreasonably obligated to prove
the 'universal negative,' i.e., that he was guilty of no offense of any kind at any
time; 3) it is 'inconsistent with the American tradition that a person should not be
considered a wrongdoer until proof establishes his guilt'; 4) the imposition of the
burden of proof on the employer is justifiable as merely an 'extension of scientific
management to industrial relations'; 5) the existence of 'just cause' for discharge
is in the nature of an affirmative defense, therefore the burden rests on the party
asserting it; 6) a 'just cause' provision in the agreement, in view of circumstances
peculiar to industrial relations, 'requires the Company, when challenged, to retrace
the (disciplinary) process and convince an impartial third person that the facts
acted upon warranted the actions taken.'
Id. at 569. But cf. National Steel Corp., 66 Lab. Arb. 533, 537 (1976) (Traynor,
Arb.)("reasonable cause," not "just cause," standard held applicable in non-disciplinary
termination of schizophrenic in remission); see also ELKOURI & ELKouR, supra note 91, 621;
Gorske, Burden of Proof in Grievance Arbitration, 43 MARQ. L. Rv. 135, 147-48 (1959); Note,
Burden of Proof in Labor Arbitrations, 3 DuKE B.J. 127, 131 (1953).
M21 Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 59 Lab. Arb. 709, 712-14 (1972) (Kates, Arb.); City of
Buffalo, 59 Lab. Arb. 334, 337 (1972) (Rinaldo, Arb.); Armstrong Cork Co., 56 Lab. Arb. 527,
529 (1971) (Wolf, Arb.).
In See, e.g., Franz Food Prods. Inc., 28 Lab. Arb. 543, 548 (1957) (Bothwell, Arb.). See
also ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 91, at 625.
In ELKOURI & ELKOURi, supra note 91, at 643-44.
"24 But see Electric Hose and Rubber Co. v. United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic
Workers, No. 196-1, slip op. at 1 (Am. Arb. Ass'n 1975) (Sloane, Impartial Chairman). In that
case, although there was no question as to the employee's absenteeism which resulted in
discharge, there was some evidence of inconsistency in the treatment of grievant and other
troubled employees. The Arbitration Board stated that the loss of 22 years of seniority com-
bined with the stigma of a discharge for alcohol-caused absenteeism required a higher stan-
dard of proof than would normally be the case in a discharge dispute. Id. at 8.
Drug discharge cases provide an exception. A survey of arbitrators indicated that the
majority require higher standards of proof in these cases, defined as clear, convincing and
conclusive or beyond a reasonable doubt, than in non-drug discharge cases. Whatever the
label applied, the arbitrators indicated that they required "substantial and irrefutable proof
that an employee was indeed engaged in the culpable act." Levin & Denenberg, How Arbitra-
tors View Drug Abuse, 31 ARB. J. 97, 98 (1976). For a comprehensive discussion of the
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be harder to prove the guilt or wrongdoing of a troubled employee.r2
For example, it has been stated that there is a strong work group
norm protecting the alcoholic and emotionally disturbed employee
from exposure, which consequently may make it difficult for wit-
nesses to agree on the inability of the'discharged employee to work
or, if relevant, on the state of his inebriation. Moreover, if the
employer is relying on job impairment, the problem of proof may be
compounded by the fact that the employee may perform satisfactor-
ily in some areas but break down in others. Thus, even though the
usual standards are applied, the employer in some instances may
be at a disadvantage in proving his case.'27
standards of proof used by arbitrators in drug discharge cases on and off company premises,
see Wynns, supra note 104.
2 Thus, cases involving alcoholics, drug addicts or the mentally disturbed are frequently
resolved against the employer because of his failure to meet the standard burden of proof.
See, e.g., Greenlee Bros. & Co., 67 Lab. Arb. 847 (1976) (Wolff, Arb.). In addition, it cannot
.be overstressed that the mere existence of the problem is not a cause, in itself, for discharge.
121 H. TRicE & J. BELAsco, supra note 2, at 18. See also Thrifty Drug Stores Co., 56 Lab.
Arb. 789, 790 (1971) (Peters, Arb.) (evidence indicated supervisors previously had covered up
grievant's intoxication).
'2 H. Tmuc & J. BELAsco, supra note 2, at 18. Mention must be made of the proof of
alcohol or drug intoxication. Many cases involve discharge or discipline of non-troubled as
well as troubled employees for violating rules which prohibit being under the influence of
alcoholic beverages or drugs on the job. E.g., Schaefer-Alabama Corp., 70 Lab. Arb. 956
(1978) (LaValley, Arb.). Severe penalties are often imposed for violation. See, e.g., Blue
Diamond Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 1136 (1976) (Summers, Arb.); General Tel. Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 1236
(1973) (Leventhal, Arb.) (penalty for first offense was two weeks disciplinary suspension and
probation period during which further violation would result in discharge). As stated by
Arbitrator Leventhal in General Tel.: "Alcohol is a serious work related problem due to the
potential for injury to the public, co-workers, property and the individual himself. For these
reasons severe penalties are generally set forth for drinking on the job, or reporting to work
under the influence of alochol." Id. at 1239. In Blue Diamond Co., the arbitrator upheld the
discharge of a driver who was drunk while driving, stating that a discharge would not be
unreasonable "particularly in the absence of any claim by the Union that he could be assigned
to warehouse or some other non-driving work." 66 Lab. Arb. at 1138; accord, Mass Transit
Administration v. Amalgamated Transit Union, No. 187-15, slip op. at 1 (Am. Arb. Ass'n
1974) (Strongin, Arb.); Standard Chlorine Chem. Co. v. Local 966, Internat'l Bhd. of Teams-
ters, No. 179-10, slip op. at 3 (Am. Arb. Ass'n 1973) (Yagoda, Arb.).
In some of these cases, where the employee did not have or was not known to have an
alcohol problem, alcoholism was not a factor at the hearing. In these cases, only the rule
violation is in issue. The arbitrator will require adequate proof that the employee was in fact
"under the influence." Trans World Airlines, 38 Lab. Arb. 1221, 1222-23 (1962) (Wal-
len, Arb.); South Penn Oil Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 718 (1957) (Duff, Arb.). But see New York Tel.
Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 1037 (1976) (Markowitz, Arb.). Clearly, the standard of proof should be
the same where the employee involved is in fact an alcoholic or drug addict. It is difficult,
however, to assess the degree to which an arbitrator may be influenced by his knowledge of
the employee's problem or may credit employer witnesses who testify as to their observations
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of the grievant and conversely ii discrediting the eniployee's denial of intoxication. See, e.g,
Sherwin-Williams Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 273 (1976) (Rezler, Arb.). In evaluating the evidence
presented by the supervisors, the arbitrator may take into account the grievant's prior drug
record and the fact that at the time of the hearing, the grievant was in a hospital being treated
for drug abuse. See City of Buffalo, 59 Lab. Arb. 334 (1972) (Rinaldo, Arb.). In any event, as
with other wrongdoings, the burden of proof of intoxication is on the employer. General Tel.
Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 1236, 1238 (1973) (Leventhal, Arb.). The employer's evidence of intoxication
may consist of the opinions of lay persons based on their observations of the grievant. It has
been stated that arbitrators may rely on the observations of non-expert supervisors where the
supervisor could" 'objectively compare an employee's normal demeanor and work habits with
those at the time his sobriety is questioned.'" Sherwin-Williams Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 273, 275
(1976) (quoting GRIEVANCE GUME 54 (BNA 1972)) (narcotics); accord, Standard Chlorine
Chem. Co. v. Local 966, Intemat'l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 179-10, slip op. at 2 (Am. Arb.
Ass'n 1973) (Yagoda, Arb.); Parkview-Gem, Inc., 59 Lab. Arb. 429, 432 (1972) (Dungan, Arb.)
(alcohol); City of Buffalo, 59 Lab. Arb. 334, 335 (1972) (Rinaldo, Arb.); Transport Workers
Union v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 142-11, slip op. at 9, at 11 (Am. Arb. Ass'n
1970) (Fallon, Impartial Chairman); cf. Howmet Corp., 60 Lab. Arb. 1160, 1163 (1963) (Sem-
bower, Arb.) (marijuana).
There is some evidence of arbitral reluctance to rely on the supervisor's observations. The
arbitrator may not accept the "symptoms" observed by the supervisors as sufficient evidence
of intoxication where any uncertainty or other explanation exists. See, e.g., Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Div., 66 Lab. Arb. 948, 950 (1976) (Rayson, Arb.). As stated in General Tel.
Co., 60 Lab. Ar. 1236 (1973) (Leventhal, Arb.):
Arbitrators generally reject attempts on the part of management representatives to
make their own medical determinations. In a case such as this, an opinion by a
medically untrained foreman that someone is under the influence, or they
"smelled" alcohol is far from a medical determination. What appears to be slow
actions or behavior to one may be only slightly below normal, or for that matter,
normal to another. It becomes difficult for an employer to sustain an allegation of
had been drinking [sic] when faced with conflicting testimony and the existence
of another probable cause for an employee's usual behavior.
Id. at 1238.
Since the employer may have difficulty sustaining an allegation that the grievant was
"under the influence" based only on the supervisor's observations, the employer often will
seek verification of the employee's condition through examination by the company-selected
doctor or scientific tests. Id. Where the employee refuses to submit to the examination or test
or leaves the job before they can be carried out, the question arises whether the employer has
met his burden by basing his case solely upon the observations of lay persons. The answer
appears to be affirmative. See Sherwin-Williams Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 273 (1976) (Rezler, Arb.);
General Tel. Co., 60 Lab. Arb. at 1238-39.
In Blue Diamond Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 1136 (1976) (Summers, Arb.), the employee refused
to take a sobriety test when accused of being "under the influence." Here, the arbitrator
concluded that refusal to take the test gave rise to a presumption of intoxication which could
be rebutted by evidence of non-intoxication. The amount of evidence necessary to rebut the
presumption was stated to be enough to "make it more probable than not that the presumed
[intoxication] was not true . . . [that is,] by preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 1140.
This was established in this case because the only evidence of intoxication was that the
employee had been speaking incoherently and slurring his words. The company admitted that
the employee always spoke incoherently when he was excited and that this was the situation
here. In addition, the arbitrator observed that the grievant, when testifying at the arbitration
hearing, spoke incoherently and slurred his words. Accordingly, the arbitrator concluded that
a reasonable person could think that the grievant was not intoxicated, since there were no
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Special Treatment of the Troubled Employee
Assuming that the employer has proved to the satisfaction of
the arbitrator that the employee engaged in the conduct for which
he was discharged, the arbitrator will then be required to consider
whether the penalty of discharge was justified. It appears that al-
though discharge normally might be the reasonable remedy for such
conduct if engaged in by an untroubled employee, it may not be for
the troubled employee because different considerations are in-
volved. Before exploring the cases some general principles should be
discussed.
Initially, the arbitrator does not require an employer to handle
every wrongdoing in the same manner. It is often said that an em-
ployer must use progressive discipline." 8 Progressive discipline
means that the employee will be .given warning of his wrongdoing
and will be given a chance over a period of time to improve his work
performance or to eliminate the cause of employer dissatisfaction.
Thus, progressive discipline calls for increasingly severe penalties
ultimately resulting, if the employee does not respond, in discharge.
Progressive discipline, however, is not required in all cases. In
some cases an employee knows without being told that he is doing
something in contravention of the rules, as, for example, when he
steals. Here, no prior warnings are required and immediate dis-
charge is appropriate.'29
Implicit in the concept of progressive discipline and suspension
other signs of intoxication. Id. at 1140-41. See also Land O'Lakes, 65 Lab. Arb. 803 (1975)
(Smythe, Arb.).
As noted by Arbitrator Leventhal in General Tel., verification of the employee's condi-
tion may help the employee where he can establish an alternative explanation for his condi-
tion. 60 Lab. Arb. at 1238. See also Continental Conveyer & Equip. Co., 69 Lab. Arb. 1143,
1144 (1977) (Tucker, Arb.).
Sometimes where a scientific test is administered, the arbitrator will not rely on its
findings of intoxication because of deficiencies in the fairness, efficiency or accuracy of the
test. See Holliston Mills, Inc., 60 Lab. Arb. 1030 (1973) (Simon, Arb.); cf. Sperry Rand Corp.,
59 Lab. Arb. 849 (1972) (Logan, Arb.) (blood alcohol test could be challenged).
12 See notes 129-131 and accompanying text infra.
2I E.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 59 Lab. Arb. 709 (1972) (Kates, Arb.). In
Southwestern Bell, the arbitrator stated:
Every employee ordinarily ought to anticipate the probability of discharge for a first
offense of theft from the Company, for wilful insubordination, for violence to a
supervisor or fellow employee while at work, for the sale, purchase or intake of
heroin or other so-called hard drugs on the job, for insults, profanity, or violence to
Company customers, and for other acts of misconduct of those kinds.
Id. at 713. Progressive discipline also may serve no purpose in other cases. In the case of




of the requirement for egregious wrongdoings is the assumption that
the employee is responsible for his actions. If a reasonable employee
knows that he should not assault a foreman, he is held responsible
for the act of assault and generally may be immediately discharged.
Similarly, if an employee is warned that his repeated absenteeism
is unacceptable and that a failure to conform will lead to increas-
ingly severe penalties and ultimately to discharge, and the employee
fails to improve, he has no defense when he is finally discharged. In
all of these cases involving the non-troubled employee, an act of will
is involved.
A problem arises when one attempts to apply these general
principles to the troubled employee. If the troubled employee can-
not help getting drunk, he may not be able to avoid being absent.
If he was drunk at work, he may not have been fully responsible
when he punched his foreman in the face. 3 , To say that an employee
is not responsible for his acts, however, does not respond to the
legitimate concerns of the employer. An employer still has a right
to have a functioning work force. Thus, arbitrators faced with disci-
pline of employees whose wrongdoing has been caused or aggravated
' by their mi, al instability, drug addiction or alcoholism are con-
fronted wiAh the problem of trying to reconcile the employer's rights
with the fact that the employee was not fully responsible for his
acts.
The arbitrator who concludes that discharge is too harsh be-
cause the employee was "troubled" faces a dilemma: the employee
may not be responsible for his acts, but what good will be served
by reinstating the employee to his job? Reinstatement puts the
troubled employee right back in the work force, where he still will
be unable to control his actions and hence hardly be productive.1 3'
"I' Chrysler Corp., 26 Lab. Arb. 295 (1956) (Wolff, Arb.). Aside from not being fully
responsible, his condition may not be viewed as a voluntary choice. As stated by one arbitra-
tor:
Problem drinking is becoming more widely accepted as a medical problem.
Alcoholism is recognized as a disease by the American Hospital Association, the
American Psychiatric Association, and the American Medical Association. As testi-
fied to by Dr. Lewandowski, no one starts and no one keeps drinking in order to
become an alcoholic. Once they become an alcoholic, it is similar to any other
illness and must be treated accordingly.
City of Buffalo, 59 Lab. Arb. 334, 336 (1972) (Rinaldo, Arb.); cf. Southwestern Ohio Steel,
Inc. v. United Steelworkers of America, No. 201-5 (Am. Arb. Ass'n 1975) (Dworkin, Arb.)
(weekend indulgence in alcohol distinguished from chronic alcoholism since former is within
grievant's control).
M' It has been well established that arbitration decisions tend to reverse discharges of
mentally ill and alcoholic employees. In 1966, Harrison M. Trice and James A. Belasco
published an important monograph entitled Emotional Health and Employer Responsibility,
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Thus, it could be argued that the troubled employee should be
treated no differently than the chronically or incurably ill or the
total incompetent who also is not responsible for wrong doings but
who need not be retained in the work force by the employer."' This
argument, however, presupposes that the troubled employee always
will be just as inadequate as the total incompetent or chronically
ill. There is a distinction, however. The troubled employee resem-
bles the chronically ill or incompetent in that he may not be respon-
sible for his actions, but he differs in that he may have the potential
for being in control of his actions and hence become an adequate
employee through rehabilitation. 13
This potential for rehabilitation has prompted arbitrators to
place at least some of these troubled employees in a special cate-
gory-neither normal (responsible for their actions) nor beyond
hope (as the total incompetent or chronically ill) of becoming a fully
functioning member of the work force. The nature of this "special
treatment" will be considered in the sections that follow.
Special Treatment for Alcoholics
Sometimes unions will argue that since alcoholism is a disease,
no disciplinary procedures are applicable at all.34 Rather, the argu-
ment goes, the alcoholic should be treated as any other sick or
mentally or physically disabled employee. To the extent that this
view purports to limit the employer's power ultimately to discharge
the chronic alcoholic, however, it generally is not accepted. 135 In-
see note 4 supra, in which they discussed the results of their study of 102 alcoholic em-
ployees, concluding that arbitrators were extremely loath to sustain discharges of such
employees. The study showed that in 55% of the cases the discharge was reversed and the
employee reinstated-a surprisingly high incidence of reinstatement.
The Trice-Belasco study indicated that of all employees reinstated, 30% of those who had
drinking or emotional problems were subsequently discharged as compared to a little more
than 10% of other employees who were reinstated after being discharged. Moreover, of the
troubled employees still employed, almost 50%-8 out of 18-were unsatisfactory after rein-
statement. The authors concluded that corrective discipline and reinstatement, without
more, was not the answer when dealing with emotionally disturbed or alcoholic employees.
Id.
132 This is not to say that an arbitrator may not explore the possibility of solutions other
than discharge, such as disability, medical leave of absence or transfer.
"I The distinction between a troubled and chronically ill or incompetent employee is not
relevant in the case of the troubled employee who is not "salvageable." Greenlee Bros. & Co.,
67 Lab. Arb. 847, 855 n.7 (1976) (Wolff, Arb.).
"' See Mass Transit Administration v. Amalgamated Transit Union, No. 187-15, slip op.
at 1, 2 (Am. Arb. Ass'n 1974) (Strongin, Arb.); P. N. Hirsch & Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 1335, 1337
(1973) (Bothwell, Arb.).




stead, there appears to be general agreement that alcoholic employ-
ees are subject to disciplinary provisions of the contract.'38 Yet,
many arbitrators have become convinced that their view of "just
cause" for discharge should be modified.'3 7 Thus, although the em-
ployer may prove that the employee was discharged for misconduct
or work impairment which, in the case of a normal employee, would
reasonably be just cause for discharge, this proof may not suffice
where an alcoholic employee is involved.3 In the case of the alco-
In See, e.g., Monte Mart-Grand Auto Concession, 56 Lab. Arb. 738 (1971) (Jacobs, Arb.).
In upholding the application of disciplinary procedures, the arbitrator distinguished Depart-
ment Store Employees Union, Local 110 v. U.S.E. Discount Dep't Stores (Bums, Arb.)
(unpublished) wherein the arbitrator determined that an admitted alcoholic should be placed
on medical leave of absence rather than be subjected to discharge since the parties had
contractually stipulated that alcoholism was illness.
I" Arbitrators often rule that a discharge was not for just cause since the employee should
have been offered an opportunity to seek rehabilitation, which includes the right to a medical
leave. See, e.g., Newspaper & Mail Deliverers Union v. New York Daily News (Jan. 25, 1978)
(Haber, Arb.) (unpublished); Mass Transit Administration v. Amalgamated Transit Union,
No. 187-15 (Am. Arb. Ass'n 1974) (Strongin, Arb.); cf. P.N. Hirsch & Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 1335,
1337-38 (1973) (BothweIl, Aib.) (discfarge permissible where alcoholic deteriorates to
point of being unable to perform duties and makes no rehabilitative efforts during previous
leaves). But see Eden Hosp., 56 Lab. Arb. 319 (1971) (Eaton, Arb.); Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
45 Lab. Arb. 932, 936 (1965) (Ables, Arb.).
In City of Buffalo, 59 Lab. Arb. 334 (1972) (Rinaldo, Arb.), the grievant, an alcoholic,
had been previously discharged and subsequently reinstated upon agreement with the union
that she seek rehabilitation. Notwithstanding her attempt to rehabilitate herself, she twice
reported for work in an intoxicated condition. The company then discharged her on the
grounds that her rehabilitation effort had failed and she was unable to perform satisfactorily.
The arbitrator found that the grievant sincerely wished to rehabilitate herself, that remissions
prior to eventual rehabilitation were not uncommon and that grievant's program of rehabili-
tation had been lacking, through no fault of her own, because of the unavailability of group
therapy in addition to Alcoholics Anonymous. Group therapy became available to the grie-
vant after the hearing. The arbitrator found the discharge penalty too severe and reinstated
the grievant. In responding to the employer's contentions, the arbitrator stated:
The employer. . . asks whose responsibility is it to see that progams [sic] are
available to persons who find themselves with the problem B- is encountering.
Doesn't the City, as her employer, have the right to extract from her certain stan-
dards of conduct and performance of her duties as they do of every other employee?
An employer has a right to discharge an employee where there is just cause.
Discharge in the field of industrial relations has been equated to capital punish-
ment because it destroys an employee's equity which has been built up over the
years of employment and leaves lasting and permanent implications which carry
with employees in their effort to seek future employment.
Her request [for reinstatement] should not be refused in light of her 15 years
employment record with the City. To deny B- this opportunity would be unwar-
ranted considering that since returning to work in September, only two incidents
have been established which it was proven interferred [sic] with B-'s ability to
properly perform.
59 Lab. Arb. at 337. But see Eastern Air Lines, 45 Lab. Arb. 932, 934 (1965) (Ables, Arb.).
In See Newspaper & Mail Deliverers Union v. New York Daily News (Jan. 25, 1978)
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holic, the arbitrator will incorporate into the just cause standard a
requirement that the employer assess the employee's potential and
willingness for rehabilitation before discharging him. 3 ' In practice
(Haber, Arb.) (unpublished); note 143 supra. But see NCR, Appleton Papers Div., 70 Lab.
Arb. 756 (1978) (Gundermann, Arb.).
"I Bordo Citrus Prods. Coop., 67 Lab. Arb. 1145, 1147 (1977) (Naehring, Arb.); Armstrong
Cork Co., 56 Lab. Arb. 527, 530 (1971) (Wolf, Arb.); United Steelworkers of America v.
Crompton & Knowles Corp., No. 33-15, slip op. at 8 (Am. Arb. Ass'n 1961) (White, Arb.) For
example, although post-discharge conduct generally is not relevant to a determination
whether the employer had just cause to discharge the employee at the time, arbitrators are
generally quite willing to take exemplary post-discharge behavior of the employee into consid-
eration in the case of the alcoholic. In light of such conduct, the arbitrator may conclude that
the discharge was too severe considering the employee's potential for recovery. One may infer
that arbitrators view the company as having misjudged the employee's potential for recovery
at the time of his discharge and should give him another chance, presumably on the theory
that they would not have discharged him had they correctly assessed his potential at that
time. See Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 965, 973 (1976) (Harter, Jr., Impartial
Chairman); Singer Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 1043, 1044 (1965) (Cahn, Arb.); Hooker Chem. Corp. v.
Niagara Hooker Employee's Union, No. 81-2, slip op. at 3, 4 (Am. Arb. Ass'n 1965) (Horvitz,
Arb.); Texaco, Inc., 42 Lab. Arb. 408, 411 (1963) (Prasow, Arb.); United Steel Workers of
America v. Crompton & Knowles Corp., No. 33-15 (Am. Arb. Ass'n 1961) (White, Arb.). But
see Electric Hose & Rubber Co. v. United Rubber Workers, No. 196-1, slip op. at 8 (Am. Arb.
Ass'n 1975) (Sloane, Impartial Chairman); cf. NCR, Appleton Papers Div., 70 Lab. Arb. 756
(1978) (Gundermann, Arb.) (adverse impact on supervisor's authority if allowed to return
outweighed post-discharge participation in rehabilitation program). But see Newspaper and
Mail Deliverers Union v. New York Daily News (Jan. 25, 1978) (Haber, Arb.) (unpublished).
Interestingly, it is not unusual for the discharge itself to precipitate rehabilitation. The
Arbitration Board in Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 965 (1976) (Harter, Jr.,
Impartial Chairman), noted that alcoholism differed from other diseases in that alcoholism
is "self-inflicted": "[I]t can be controlled only through an exercise of will. If an individual
has enough incentive he is more likely to muster the required strength of will to bring himself
under control. Sometimes a crisis provides that incentive." Id. at 972. The arbitrator also
noted the remarkable pattern that occurs in cases involving discharge of alcoholics, stating:
Despite the exercise of progressive discipline by the employer the alcoholic em-
ployee fails to respond to warnings, supervisors, and other forms of discipline. When
he finally exhausts the patience of the employer, he is discharged.
During the crisis of the discharge while waiting for an arbitration hearing, he
seems to pull himself together. He cooperates with those treating him, allows him-
self to be hospitalized, and may join Alcoholics Anonymous. By the time of the
hearing his Union can point to his progress toward recovery. Authorities testify
optimistically as to his prognosis.
Id. The Arbitration Board surmised that the "arbitrator is placed in an unusual position."
Id. "If he ignores the post-dismissal behavior and denies the grievance, he may be foreclosing
on all hope for the grievant. Usually the grievant is an employee of long service and old enough
to make other employment difficult to find." Id. Thus, it is that the arbitrators do take into
consideration post-discharge behavior, concluding that the discharge was too severe in view
of the potential for recovery. The concluding statement in Pacific Northwest is illuminating.
The Grievant was not dismissed for just cause. The Employer's pre-discharge
investigation failed to uncover that he still retained a capacity to recover. A reason-
able person might have imposed a severe penalty. However a reasonable person
realizing that the Grievant had a good chance to recover would not have discharged
him. The officials of the Employer displayed considerable generosity and patience,
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this means that, at the very least, the employer must have given the
employee a chance for rehabilitation. If the employer discharges the
employee without having done so, the discharge will not be sus-
tained. 1 0
The modern view as to the prerequisites to discharge of an
alcoholic employee, as outlined by arbitrator Lewis Kesselman, is:
(1) That the employee be informed as to the nature of his illness.
(2) He must be directed or encouraged to seek treatment.
(3) He must refuse treatment or
(4) He must fail to make substantial progress over a considerable
period of time. "'
It is important to note that the employer is expected actively to
direct or to encourage the employee to seek rehabilitation.' This is
but acted without complete information.
Id. at 975.
In Pacific Northwest the employee had 27 years of service and a history of drinking
problems for more than 20 years. He capped off a long career of difficulties, both on and off
the job, with an unexcused absence for 3 days which, in addition to an accumulation of prior
events, caused the employer to doubt whether he was worth retaining. Id. at 974. The arbitra-
tor concluded that "because the grievant has performed long years of service and because
there is a reasonable prospect that he will recover, [the discharge] penalty is not appropriate.
The Employer misjudged [the employee's] capacity to respond to treatment." Id. at 975.
Accordingly, the arbitrator reinstated the grievant, with qualifications.
1O See note 139 supra. An anomalous result occurs when one treats drug addiction,
alcoholism or a mental disorder as a defense to a charge that misconduct or impaired job
performance is cause for discharge. For the same wrongdoing, an employee who is not
"troubled" may be discharged whereas the true "troubled" employee may not. This anomaly
stems from the notion that normal employees are capable of obeying the rules; hence the rules
may be strictly enforced against them. Addicted or mentally disturbed employees may be
incapable of obeying such rules because of their addiction.
Special treatment thus means that alcoholic employees will be given second chances,
unlike non-troubled employees. For example, an employee who physically attacks his fore-
man may expect immediate discharge. Indeed, such discharges have been upheld in many
cases. E.g., Newspaper & Mail Deliveries Union v. New York Daily News (Aug. 5, 1974)
(Haber, Arb.) (unpublished). Where the assailant had a drinking problem and a previously
unblemished record, however, the same arbitrator reversed the discharge. Newspaper & Mail
Deliverers Union v. New York Daily News (Jan. 25, 1978) (Haber, Arb.) (unpublished);
accord, New York Daily News v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers Union (Dec. 30, 1970) (House,
Impartial Chairman) (unpublished).
"I American Synthetic Rubber Corp., 73-1 ARB 8070 (1973) (Kesselman, Arb.). The
requirement that the employee be directed or encouraged to seek treatment often may entail
employer assistance in the form of leaves of absence, payment of treatment costs, granting
of sick leave benefits and the like. Id. at 3277. The requirement that the employee be given a
considerable amount of time to progress must be complied with despite the employee's having
received a last warning that continued failure to cope with the problem will mean his job.
Id. at 3278.
"2 But cf. P. N. Hirsch & Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 1335 (1973) (Bothwell, Arb.) (discharge but
no encouragement or direction to seek rehabilitation).
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so even where the employer has established and makes a program
of counselling and treatment available to alcoholic employees. The
employer cannot passively rely on the employee's taking advantage
of the program on his own." Arbitrators will reinstate employees
where no active effort was made, even if the employee was told of
the program. '44
It should also be noted that, as has been previously discussed,
arbitrators do not expect employers to tolerate indefinitely alcoholic
employees who are incapable of carrying out their basic responsibili-
ties. Thus, where the employer has fulfilled his obligations with
respect to the employee's rehabilitation and the employee's miscon-
duct continues, either because rehabilitation efforts have failed or
the employee proves to be unsalvageable, the employer's discharge
of the employee may be sustained. '45 Interestingly, however, some
arbitrators recently have recognized that temporary relapse may not
preclude eventual rehabilitation, and they may require more than
113 Arbitrators understand that the alcoholic employee is the last person to recognize and
admit that he has a problem. See General Elec. Co. v. United Elec. Workers Local 506 (Dec.
9, 1976) (Joseph, Arb.) (unpublished); General Elec. Co. v. United Elec. Workers Local 506
(Nov. 1, 1976) (Mullen, Jr., Arb.) (unpublished); cf. General Elec. Co. (Nov. 9, 1978) (Clark,
Arb.) (unpublished) (responsibility placed on Union).
The company's lack of knowledge of the eniployee's condition may be raised in defense
of the employer's failure to use active efforts to convince the employee to seek help. Supervi-
sors, however, are expected to be sensitive to the possibility of a problem where an employee's
work performance or behavior is suspicious. General Elec. Co. v. United Elec. Workers Local
506 (Nov. 1, 1976) (Mullen, Jr., Arb.) (unpublished).
"I E.g., General Elec. Co. v. United Elec. Workers Local No. 506 (Dec 9, 1976) (Joseph,
Arb.) (unpublished); General Elec. Co. v. United Elec. Workers Local No. 506 (Nov. 1, 1976)
(Mullen, Jr., Arb.) (unpublished).
It is interesting that Arbitrator Mullen reinstated the grievant without back pay, believ-
ing that the grievant could not be completely exonerated for failing to take advantage of the
program on his own, id., whereas Arbitrator Joseph reinstated the grievant with back pay.
General Electric (Dec. 9, 1976) (Joseph, Arb.) (unpublished). The author of this Article was
advised that the grievant reinstated by Arbitrator Joseph was subsequently discharged for
excessive absenteeism but that the grievant reinstated by Arbitrator Mullen had become a
productive employee and was continuing to participate in the program.
,' See American Synthetic Rubber Corp., 73-1 ARB No. 8070 (1973) (Kesselman, Arb.);
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 54 Lab. Arb. 1090 (1970) (Porter, Arb.); Doane Prods. Co., 71-1 ARB
No. 8051 (1970); Cities Serv. Oil Co., 70-2 ARB No. 8642 (1970); Emge Packing Co., 52 Lab.
Arb. 195 (1968) (Uible, Arb.); International Nickel Co., Inc., 68-2 ARB No. 8593 (1968); Green
River Steel Corp., 49 Lab. Arb. 117 (1967) (Chalfie, Arb.); Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 45 Lab.
Arb. 932 (1965) (Ables, Arb.); Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 65-2 ARB No. 8816 (1965); Broderick
Co., 64-3 ARB No. 8946 (1964); Hunt Foods and Indus. Inc., 64 ARB No. 8960 (1964); Pitts-
burgh Steel Co., 63-2 ARB No. 8756 (1963). See also County of Wayne v. Wayne County
Sheriff's Ass'n, No. 2236 (Vol. Lab. Arb. Tribunal 1978) (Roumell, Arb.); Electric Hose &
Rubber Co. v. United Rubber Workers, No. 196-1 (Am. Arb. Ass'n 1975) (Sloane, Impartial
Chairman); Whitman & Barnes Div., United Greenfield Corp. v. UAW Local 157, No. 98-16
(Am. Arb. Ass'n 1966) (Haughton, Arb.).
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one chance be given to an employee who has relapsed but who is
sincere in his desire to rehabilitate himself and continues with the
rehabilitation program. 4 '
Where the employer has discharged the alcoholic employee
without giving the employee a chance for rehabilitation, the arbitra-
tor, as previously stated, probably will not sustain the discharge.
What will the employer's remedy be, however?
Reinstating an employee who is incapable of complying with
work requirements because of his problem will unfairly burden the
employer. 4 ' Indeed, a subsequent discharge will be inevitable. Arbi-
trators recognize this problem. Hence, reinstatements are almost
always conditional on the employee's participation or continued
participation in a rehabilitation program,' and often on his contin-
ued good behavior.'
Special Treatment for the Mentally Disturbed
Employer's actions adversely affecting the mentally disturbed
employee are at issue in a nuniber of arbitration cases.' 5' As pre-
146 City of Buffalo, 59 Lab. Arb. 334, 337 (1972) (Rinaldo, Arb.). In Thrifty Drug Stores
Co., 56 Lab. Arb. 789 (1971) (Peters, Arb.), although the company had been very tolerant
and had given grievant two medical leaves in 1 year for rehabilitation, the arbitrator refused
to uphold the discharge even though the employee returned to work intoxicated. Several
factors militated in the grievant's favor, including a long, excellent work record, a positive
attitude and high moral character, and an assurance that he would join a Spanish-speaking
therapy group which had not been part of his previous rehabilitation program. Id. at 792-94.
14 This criticism has been made as a result of a study which ascertained that a high
percentage of those employees reinstated by arbitrators were subsequently discharged.
EMPLOYER REsPoNSMMrIY supra note 4, at 25.
M This sometimes involves a medical leave or leave of absence. See Greenlee Bros. &
Co., 67 Lab. Arb. 847, 856 (1976) (Wolff, Arb.); Monte Mart-Grand Auto Concession, 56 Lab.
Arb. 738, 747 (1971) (Jacobs, Arb.).
149 In Newspaper & Mail Deliverers Union v. New York Daily News (Jan. 25, 1978)
(Haber, Arb.) (unpublished), the arbitrator imposed a suspension for six months without pay
and conditioned reinstatement on the grievant's participation in a "continuing program of
alcoholic rehabilitation and in a related program of psychological support." The House award
in an arbitration between the same parties, New York Daily News v. Newspaper & Mail
Deliverers Union (Dec. 30, 1970) (House, Impartial Chairman) (unpublished), did not choose
to suspend the grievant but conditionally reinstated him without back pay. The conditions
were that the grievant join Alcoholics Anonymous and remain a member of that organization
for the duration of his employment with the publisher and refrain from drinking alcoholic
beverages on the job or being found under the influence of liquor on the job upon pain of
discharge by the publisher. Id.; accord, Land O'Lakes Bridgeman Creamery, 65 Lab. Arb.
803, 804 (1975) (Smythe, Arb.); Texaco, Inc., 42 Lab. Arb. 408, 412 (1963) (Prasow, Arb.).
But see City of Buffalo, 59 Lab. Arb. 334 (1972) (Rinaldo, Arb.) (unconditional reinstate-
ment).
For an example of unusual additional conditions, see County of Wayne v. Wayne County
Sheriff's Ass'n, No. 2236 (Vol. Lab. Arb. Tribunal 1978) (Roumell, Arb.).
"50 These actions may involve not only discharge, but also other forms of adverse action
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viously discussed, the existence of a problem alone will not justify
discharge or refusal to reinstate.'51 It is well established, however,
that where the mentally disturbed employee's presence on the job
constitutes or will constitute a safety hazard to himself or others,
the employer is justified in taking action which will eliminate the
hazard, even though it will adversely affect the employee.1 2 More
difficult cases involve discharge and refusal to reinstate where there
is no safety hazard but rather alleged actual or probable inability
adequately to perform the job.' 3 Do arbitrators apply standard cri-
teria or do they, as with the alcoholic, require some special
treatment?
Mental disorders may be more or less severe and may impair
work performance to different degrees.'54 Therefore, the arbitrator
first will have to be satisfied not only that there is a mental disorder
but that it makes the employee unfit for work or impairs his work
such as refusal to promote because of mental unfitness, and refusal to reinstate after medical
leave of absence. See notes 151-171 and accompanying text infra.
,', See, e.g., Foundry Equip. Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 333 (1957) (Vokoun, Arb.) (confinement
to mental hospital); International Harvester Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 229 (1955) (Cole, Arb.) (sexual
irregularity). Without some nexus between the problem and the employee's ability to perform
the job, a failure to promote an employee because of his unrelated problem would also not
be justified.
152 Transfer, demotion, layoff, refusal to reinstate or discharge, particularly if no other
job is available to which an employee could be transferred, may be upheld on the basis of a
safety risk. The arbitrator will have to consider medical evidence regarding the nature of the
employee's condition and the hazard his condition poses in his particular job. See Herr-Voss
Corp., 70 Lab. Arb. 497 (1978) (Sherman, Arb.); Ashtabula Bow Socket Co., 45 Lab. Arb.
377, 383 (1965) (Dworkin, Arb.) (refusal to reinstate), 45 Lab. Arb. 384, 387 (Supplemental
Opinion); Alcas Cutlery Corp., 38 Lab. Arb. 297, 300 (1962) (Guthrie, Arb.); Hiller Chevrolet-
Cadillac, Inc., 37 Lab. Arb. 629, 633-34 (1961) (Mueller, Arb.) (refusal to reinstate; employee
subject to episodes of violence); Maremont Automotive Prods., Inc., 37 Lab. Arb. 175, 176-
77 (1961) (Kelliher, Arb.) (non-disciplinary refusal to continue in employment); Chrysler
Corp., 26 Lab. Arb. 295 (1956) (Wolff, Arb.); ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 91, at 677-79.
I' Where an employee is seeking promotion to a higher level job, it appears that mental
or psychological fitness, where relevant, may be a factor in considering his "ability and
fitness" for the job. If the job entails "psychological strain and stress" an employer may pass
over the senior employee whose anxiety and fear in connection with his work would make him
unfit. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 556, 559 (1954) (Ross, Arb.); Bethlehem Steel
Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 683, 685 (1952) (Shipman, Arb.); cf. Titanium Metals Corp., 49 Lab. Arb.
1144 (1967) (Block, Arb.) (fear of heights as disqualification for work on a high crane after a
trial period); Seeger Refrigerator Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 525 (1951) (Lockhart, Arb.) (bad attitude
as disqualification for supervisory position). See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 91,
at 599-603.
" Sometimes, mental disorders may not impair work performance at all. The well-
known case of the paranoid as night watchman, see text accompanying note 52 supra, is
relevant. Such an emotionally ill person may function well in this capacity but may fare
poorly on an assembly line. The "workaholic's" neurosis also may not "impair" work perform-
ance. EMPLOYER RasPONSIaILrry supra note 4, at 18, 29-33.
EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY
performance."' Where he is not satisfied that this is the case, the
refusal to reinstate or the discharge will not be sustained. Where the
arbitrator is satisfied that the employee's mental condition is im-
pairing his job performance or will do so if the employee is rein-
stated, what the arbitrator will do is not clear.
Certainly, discharges'56 and refusals to reinstate'57 have been
upheld where the necessary connection between the mental disorder
and the present or future work impairment has been established.
There is, however, evidence of special consideration for the mentally
disturbed employee. As with the alcoholic, arbitrators have some-
times excused misconduct by the mentally disturbed employee be-
cause the employee is not fully responsible for his actions"' and have
required employers who are reluctant to reinstate formerly mentally
incapacitated employees to "go the second mile" and give them a
chance.159 In addition, although arbitrators reject the argument that
disciplinary procedures should not be applicable to alcoholics on the
grounds that alcoholism is an illness, they do not do so with respect
to mental illness. Arbitrators are emphatic in pointing out that a
termination of a mentally disturbed employee is non-disciplinary,"'
albeit, as a practical matter, the employee is out of a job. Moreover,
where the contract permits, arbitrators occasionally will criticize
employers who discharge a mentally ill employee because of inade-
quate performance when the employee should have been placed on
medical leave."'
' Philco Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 568 (1964) (Davis, Arb.); Alcas Cutlery Corp., 38 Lab. Arb.
297 (1962) (Guthrie, Arb.). Where an employer refuses to let an employee continue working
and either terminates or places him on sick leave because of apparent medical incapacity,
the action is non-disciplinary and the employer is not held to the same heavy standard of
proof as in a disciplinary case. Arandell Corp., 56 Lab. Arb. 832, 834 (1971) (Hazel, Arb.).
11 Arandell Corp., 56 Lab. Arb. 832 (1971) (Hazelwood, Arb.); Fischer Scientifi& Co., 66-
1 ARB. No. 8011 (1965) (Turkus, Arb.).
,5 United States Steel Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. 545, 549 (1966) (Rock, Arb.).
"' Herr-Voss Corp., 70 Lab. Arb. 497, 500 (1978) (Sherman, Arb.); Cities Serv. Ref.
Corp., 39 Lab. Arb. 604 (1962) (Coffey, Arb.); Chrysler Corp., 26 Lab. Arb. 295, 299 (1956)
(Wolff, Arb.). See also Associated Press, 49 Lab. Arb. 564, 568 (1967) (Sugarman, Arb.). In
Cities Service, discharge of an employee who failed to return to work from sick leave as
ordered was "heedless of and without necessary attention to the mitigating and extenuating
circumstances" since the employee was schizophrenic and his behavior could not "be
measured by standards that apply to a reasonably prudent man." Id. at 606.
159 E.g., City of Hartford, 69 Lab. Arb. 303 (1977) (Mallon, Arb.); National Steel Corp.,
66 Lab. Arb. 533 (1976) (Traynor, Arb.).
"' E.g., Arandell Corp., 56 Lab. Arb. 832 (1971) (Hazelwood, Arb.); Maremont Automo-
tive Prods., Inc., 37 Lab. Arb. 175 (1961) (Kelliher, Arb.).
I Menasco Mfg. Co., 19 Lab. Arb. 405 (1952) (Pollard, Arb.) (otherwise competent
employee too nervous to work). See also Herr-Voss Corp., 70 Lab. Arb. 497, 500 (1978)
(Sherman, Arb.).
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Finally, arbitrators recognize that there may be a connection
between the employee's mental disorder and the nature of the em-
ployee's particular job. Thus, where the nature of the job is such
that the employee presents a safety hazard or where the nature of
the job is incompatible with or exacerbating the employee's emo-
tional problem, arbitrators may expect the employer to explore the
possibility of transferring the employee to a job he can handle safely
and competently.162 This approach clearly is consistent with the
treatment by arbitrators of disabled or otherwise handicapped em-
ployees. 163
The behavior of the mentally disturbed and the alcoholic in the
work place is sometimes analogous. For example, their work per-
formance may be impaired, they may engage in misconduct and
violate company rules, and neither may be fully responsible for his
acts. Nevertheless, arbitrators seldom explicity require employers to
direct the mentally disturbed.employee to seek rehabilitation prior
to taking adverse action as in the case of the alcoholic, except that
the employer must place the severely disturbed employee on medi-
cal or sick leave rather than discharge him."4 It is clear, however,
that employers will not be able to remove permanently the mentally
disturbed employee with ease. The employer will be encouraged to
retain the functioning employee if possible, perhaps in another job.
In cases involving reinstatement of employees who have been se-
verely disturbed but are now in a state of remission, the arbitrator
may look to the employee's present capacity for work and order
reinstatement, unless future relapses would create real safety
risks.'65 In some cases, the employer will be required to reinstate the
employee to his former job and in others, to a job which will not
exacerbate his problem.'66 One may conclude that an employer is
"I2 Cf. Hyco, Inc., 66 Lab. Arb. 86 (1976) (Nichols, Arb.) (epileptic); Maremont Automo-
tive Prods., Inc., 37 Lab. Arb. 175, 176 (1961) (Kelliher, Arb.) (denial of right to continued
employment denied because no alternative job available). See also ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra
note 91, at 677. An alcoholic or drug addicted employee may be less of a risk in certain jobs
than in others. Cf. Blue Diamond Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 1136, 1138 (1976) (Summers, Arb.)
(discharge of driver upheld particularly since union had not suggested transfer to warehouse).
"I3 See, e.g., Hyco, Inc., 66 Lab. Arb. 86, 88-90 (1976) (Nichols, Arb.).
This approach is also in line with an approach often used in the case of incompetent
employees. See L. STESSIN, EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE 166-69 (1960).
"I See Herr-Voss Corp., 70 Lab. Arb. 497 (1978) (Sherman, Arb.); Chrysler Corp., 26
Lab. Arb. 295, 300 (1956) (Wolff, Arb.) (discharge voided but no reinstatement until such
time as employee's presence would not constitute safety risk to himself or others).
,65 See, e.g., Hiller Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 37 Lab. Arb. 629 (1961) (Mueller, Arb.);
Chrysler Corp., 26 Lab. Arb. 295 (1956) (Wolff, Arb.).
6I E.g., West Penn Power Co., 67 Lab. Arb. 1085 (1976) (Blue, Arb.); Dayton Malleable
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under some obligation to accommodate the particular needs of the
mentally unstable employee. 67 Finally, arbitrators do recognize the
burden on the employer when unstable employees are returned to
or are retained in the work force and hence may impose probation-
ary periods, 6 ' retain jurisdiction for a limited period to handle po-
tential problems,'69 give the company the express right to make
periodic examinations 7 ' or make reinstatement conditional upon
continued treatment or taking of medication."'
Special Treatment for the Drug Addict
Arbitrators generally believe that the drug addict, like the alco-
holic, is subject to discipline. In the case of the alcoholic, arbitrators
have evolved new concepts of what constitutes "just cause" for dis-
charge in recognition of the nature of alcoholism. If one accepts the
premise that the drug addict resembles the alcoholic in that he is
not in control of his actions because of his addiction and, perhaps,
can be rehabilitated and become a satisfactory employee,"72 one
might expect to see the evolution of similar concepts applied. Al-
though the cases are too few in number" to determine a definite
trend, there are indications that arbitrators will be less sympathetic
to the drug user or addict than to the alcoholic."74
Iron Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 959, 963 (1964) (Stouffer, Arb.); Philco Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 568 (1964)
(Davis, Arb.). See also Johns-Manville Perlite Corp., 67 Lab. Arb. 1255 (1977) (Traynor,
Arb.).
"I But cf. Hiller Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 37 Lab. Arb. 629 (1961) (Mueller, Arb.) (ac-
commodation not required if excessively burdensome or costly).
i" See, e.g., National Steel Corp., 66 Lab. Arb. 533 (1976) (Traynor, Arb.).
" See, e.g., Ashtabula Bow Socket Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 377 (1965) (Dworkin, Arb.).
170 See, e.g., Dayton Malleable Iron Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 959 (1964) (Stouffer, Arb.).
II Herr-Voss Corp., 70 Lab. Arb. 497 (1978) (Sherman, Arb.). See also Foundry Equip.
Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 333 (1957) (Vokoun, Arb.). One interesting notion is the union's role.
Sometimes the employee in remission may avoid relapse if he takes medication and continues
treatment. Interestingly, in one case where a reinstated employee was in such a position, the
arbitrator expressly placed the responsibility for monitoring the employee's compliance upon
the union, not the company. Dayton Malleable Iron Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 959 (1964) (Stouffer,
Arb.). See also Philco Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 568, 570 (1964) (Davis, Arb.) (arbitrator held union
representatives to an obligation to assist the company in insuring the grievant's continued
efficiency).
,72 A heroin addict, although unfit for work, may become able to perform satisfactorily
by participating in a methadone maintenance program. See Great Lakes Steel Corp., 57 Lab.
Arb. 884, 889 (1971) (Mittenthal, Arb.).
In Few drug abuse cases involve the addict although a number concern possession, sale,
use or being under the influence of drugs by non-addicts. See generally Levin & Denenberg,
supra note 124. In the few cases involving addicts or users of hard drugs, discharge was
imposed because of drug-related conduct, such as use of hard drugs, rather than for miscon-
duct or job impairment per se.
"7 In Sherwin-Williams Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 273 (1976) (Rezler, Arb.), a drug addict was
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For example, arbitrators generally tolerate an employer's more
rigorous enforcement of rules prohibiting possession and use of
drugs on company premises than of identical rules for alcohol. Thus,
arguments based on inconsistency of treatment of the employee
drinking on the premises and the employee taking drugs on the
premises may not be persuasive." 5
Moreover, arbitrators regard employee conduct involving hard
drugs, whether or not the employee is addicted, as very serious
offenses, more so than similar conduct involving soft drugs or alco-
hol.'76 Thus, for example, use or possession of hard drugs on the
premises generally will be viewed as just cause for discharge.'7 7 In
discharged for being under the influence of drugs while on the job. The union urged the
arbitrator to treat drug addiction as an illness and require the employer to give the employee
an opportunity to cure himself, rather than subject him to discharge. The arbitrator stated
that he was aware of the school of thought which advanced this viewpoint and was in sympa-
thy with the suggestion of the union but that he believed his duty as an arbitrator was to
interpret the provisions of the agreement. Id. at 276; cf. Hayes-Albion Corp., 70 Lab. Arb.
696 (1978) (Glendon, Arb.) (emotional illness); NCR, Appleton Papers Div., 70 Lab. Arb. 756
(1978) (Gundermann, Arb.) (alcoholism).
"' Plant rules may prohibit possession and use of intoxicating beverages or drugs on the
premises or being at work under the influence of either. Drug rules, however, may be enforced
more rigorously than rules against alcohol. Where this occurs, unions may argue inconsistency
of treatment in drug cases. In at least one case, which involved discharge for smoking mari-
juana, the arbitrator refused to consider the company's disparate treatment of alcohol and
drugs, looking only to the consistency of the company's treatment of marijuana users. Com-
bustion Eng'r Inc., 70 Lab. Arb. 318 (1978) (Jewett, Arb.). The arbitrator stated that the fact
that the company regarded marijuana smoking as a "gross violation of its rules" as opposed
to intake of alcohol, was acceptable and that "[t]his attitude is born out by society at large
in that it is still illegal to use or possess marijuana in most jurisdictions." Id. at 320. See also
Pepsi-Cola Bottlers, 68 Lab. Arb. 792 (1977) (Klein, Arb.); Howmet Corp., 60 Lab. Arb. 1160,
1163 (1973) (Sembower, Arb.). But cf. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 59 Lab. Arb. 709, 712
(1972) (Kates, Arb.) (drug rules as applied to amphetamines should not be different than
alcohol rules).
176 Wynns, supra note 104, at 25. Hard drugs include heroin, cocaine, and opium deriva-
tives, whereas soft drugs are items such as marijuana, tranquilizers, amphetamines and
barbituates. Id. at 24 n.3.
By definition, the addict generally will be a user of hard drugs. Thus, there is the
anomaly that the use of hard drugs by an addict will be viewed as a more serious offense than
the use of soft drugs by a non-addict, even though the addict is not acting voluntarily,
whereas, in contrast, a non-addict user of soft drugs is acting voluntarily.
E.g., Lever Bros., 70 Lab. Arb. 75, 78 (1977) (Stix, Arb.); Kentile Floors, Inc., 57 Lab.
Arb. 919, 921 (1971) (Block, Arb.) (dictum); cf. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 59 Lab. Arb. 709,
713-14 (1972) (Kates, Arb.) (first offense possession of amphetamine in plant; distinguished
between amphetamine and narcotics). The effect on the company's operation is sometimes
stressed. See Levin & Denenberg, supra note 124, at 102.
A distinction has been made between the hard drug addict and the individual on metha-
done maintenance. See Great Lakes Steel Corp., 57 Lab. Arb. 884, 886-87 (1971) (Mittenthal,
Arb.). In contrast to the individual on methadone maintenance, the heroin addict's "endless
craving" for the drug and the accompanying functional disability makes him a "menace" and
a "clear threat to the security of the plant and the work force." Id. at 886-87.
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addition, the general rule that misconduct away from the workplace
on the employee's own time does not justify discharge except where
the conduct "has an adverse effect on the company's business or
reputation, the morale and well-being of other employees, or the
employee's ability to perform his regular duties," 7 8 which is applic-
able to alcoholics or soft drug users, takes some interesting twists
where hard drug users or addicts are concerned. Normally, specific
evidence tending to show probable adverse effect is required.171
Where the employee involved in off-the-premises misconduct is an
addict or user of hard drugs, arbitrators may infer a probable ad-
verse impact on the plant without specific evidence. 80 In one case,
for example, an employee was convicted of cocaine possession and
use. Although there was no evidence that he ever came to work
under the influence of drugs or that his work was in any way im-
paired, the arbitrator credited medical testimony that in its ad-
vanced stages the grievant would present a safety hazard.' 81
Employers sometimes give drug addicted as well as alcoholic
employees a chance to rehabilitate themselves before imposing dis-
charge. The employer is free to discharge a drug addicted or alco-
holic employee, however, once he has been given the chance for
rehabilitation and has failed.8 2 In considering whether the discharge
I'l See Wheaton Indus. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, No. 195-5, slip op. at 6 (Am. Arb.
Ass'n 1975) (Kerrison, Arb.); note 98 supra.
"I In the case of soft drugs, the general rule applies where the employee is discharged
because of his conviction for possession. Without specific evidence of "adverse effect" the
conviction standing alone generally will not be viewed as cause for discharge. See note 104
supra. See generally Wynns, supra note 104, at 21-22, 26-27. For example, in one case, use of
marijuana which allegedly created a safety hazard by dulling one's senses did not justify
discharge because such a hazard did not in fact occur. Macnaughton-Brooks, Inc., 60 Lab.
Arb. 125 (1973) (Shistler, Arb.). But cf. Port Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 60 Lab. Arb. 430, 431
(1973) (Wyckoff, Arb.) (arbitrator would uphold discharge for marijuana conviction if proba-
tion revoked).
"' See generally Wynns, supra note 104, at 21-22.
chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 891, 893 (1961) (Duff, Arb.). See Great
Lakes Steel Corp., 57 Lab. Arb. 884, 886 (1971) (Mittenthal, Arb.) (heroin addict per se unfit
for work). In Kentile Floors, Inc., 57 Lab. Arb. 919 (1971) (Block, Arb.), the employee was
convicted of possession of amphetamine sulfate, a misdemeanor resulting in probation; the
arbitrator reversed the discharge since the conviction on a misdemeanor charge of narcotics
possession had no discernible effect on the employer's business or on his employer-employee
relationships. It seems clear from the aribtrator's reasoning that had the grievant been a user
of hard drugs he would have sustained the discharge "without hesitation." Id. at 921. The
arbitrator stressed that the individual had not been convicted of the felony of narcotics use,
and that there was no "basis for assuming a comparable impact upon the work force." Id.
See also Wheaton Indus. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, No. 195-5, slip op. (Am. Arb. Ass'n
1975) (Kerrison, Arb.); Macnaughton-Brooks, Inc., 60 Lab. Arb. 125 (1973) (Shistler, Arb.).
"' See, e.g., Sherwin-Williams Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 273 (1976) (Rezler, Arb.).
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should be upheld, arbitrators may tolerate a disparity in the degree
of the "chance for rehabilitation" offered by the employer to its
alcoholic as opposed to its drug addicted employees.'83 Moreover,
although published cases involving drug addicts are few in number,
arbitrators do not appear to be requiring employers to give the drug
addicted employee a chance for rehabilitation prior to discharge, as
they do with alcoholics.1 4
That arbitrators are less sympathetic to the drug addict than
the alcoholic may be consistent with the general attitudes present
in society. After all, society impliedly encourages the social con-
sumption of alcohol, but drug use is unlawful. Moreover, many
arbitrators often consider mitigating factors such as age, seniority
and prior good record of an employee in assessing the appropriate-
ness of the discharge penalty.' 5 Since problem drinking generally
occurs during the middle years of an employee's career' 81 whereas
the drug addicted employee is more likely to be young, these factors
will frequently not be considered in the case of a discharged addict.
Conclusion As To Arbitral Trends
It is clear that employers cannot treat the alcoholic like any
other employee. Although his behavior may justify discharge were
he a normal employee, this employee generally cannot be held com-
pletely responsible because of his problem. On the other hand, the
employer cannot be required to tolerate an inadequate employee
indefinitely. The arbitrators have evolved certain principles in
trying to balance the societal needs of the alcoholic and the needs
of the employer, and have identified the characteristics which dif-
ferentiate the alcoholic from the permanently inadequate employee,
for example, the incompetent and the incurably ill, which the em-
ployer should not have to tolerate. The distinguishing factor is the
'8 E.g., Lever Bros., 70 Lab. Arb. 75 (1977) (Stix, Arb.).
"I See Levin & Denenberg, supra hote 124, at 107-08. Interestingly, the authors noted
that some arbitrators recommended a reinstatement conditioned on rehabilitation but felt
powerless to order it. Apart from any affirmative obligation on the employer to encourage
rehabilitation prior to discharge, the authors noted that 75% of the 87 arbitrators responding
to a questionnaire sent to members of the National Academy of Arbitrators felt that were the
grievant enrolled in a treatment program or were he to convince the arbitrator of his sincere
desire to end his habit, the arbitrator might, under some circumstances, reduce the discharge
penalty to a suspension conditioned on the employee's participation in a bona-fide rehabilita-
tion program. Id.
" EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 4, at 25.




possibility of rehabilitation. Where the employer has "gone the
extra mile" with the employee and has directed the employee to
seek rehabilitation or to avail himself of some rehabilitation offered
by the company, the employer will have fulfilled his obligation, and
should the employee not accept the offer, he may be discharged.
While the drug addict would seem to share the same character-
istics as the alcoholic, it is much less certain whether arbitrators will
balance their needs and those of the employer in quite the same
manner. There apparently is no trend toward requiring the em-
ployer to give the addicted employee a chance for rehabilitation
prior to discharge as there is with alcoholics.
Although the special treatment takes a somewhat different
form with respect to the mentally ill, it is clear that the employer
will be required to make special efforts to retain the troubled em-
ployee in the workplace and that, as with the alcoholic who is being
treated, he will have to retain the mentally ill employee who, be-
cause of remission, treatment or medication, is able to do an accept-
able job.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS
The preceding analyses of statutes, administrative policies and
arbitral decisions indicate that treatable alcoholism, mental illness
and in some cases drug addiction are generally no longer considered
barriers to successful employment and that the role of the employer
in assuming responsibility for the rehabilitation of otherwise quali-
fied troubled employees is encouraged and often mandated. It ap-
pears that workmen's compensation laws also may play a role in
encouraging employers to assume this responsibility.
Workmen's compensation laws make the employer financially
responsible, irrespective of fault, for an employee's job-connected
injuries and illnesses which result in an inability to work.1 7 Initially,
the laws extended to physical injuries or illnesses only. 8 Since em-
"1 The need for statutory compensation schemes arose out of the contraction of common-
law remedies available to the injured employee during the period of industrial expansion at
the turn of the century. Three defenses afforded the employer-assumption of risk, contribu-
tory negligence, and the fellow servant doctrine-left the employee virtually remediless. 1A
A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 4.30 (1979).
"' While some statutes expressly require "physical injury" or "injury to the physical
structure of the claimant's body," other states have imposed a "physical injury" requirement
by drawing upon the common-law impact rule to supplement skeletal statutory language.
Note, Workmen's Compensation-The Compensability of Nervous Injuries From Psychic
Trauma-Who's Afraid of Wolfe?, 25 U. KAN. L. REV. 158, 161-62 (1976). Thus, courts have
uniformly found distinct physical injury caused by mental stimulus to be compensable. See,
1979]
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ployers were absolutely responsible for the resulting costs, they were
encouraged to prevent accidents. Thus, it was in the employer's
financial interest to eliminate from the work force employees whose
problems, such as alcoholism, drug addiction, or mental disability,
could make them more susceptible to accidents.'81 The same may
be said today except that removal of such employees is impermissi-
ble in most cases because of federal and state statutes. It therefore
seems that the avenue of self-protection for the employer is rehabili-
tation.
Although the liability of the employer for the physical injury to
the troubled employee whose reactions were impaired was estab-
e.g., Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 241 P.2d 299 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App.), aff'd sub noma. Firemen's Fund Indem. Co. v. State Indus. Acc. Comm'n, 39 Cal. 2d
831, 250 P.2d 148 (1952) (en banc) (stroke and paralysis); Insurance Dep't v. Dinsmore, 233
Miss. 569, 102 So. 2d 691, aff'd on rehearing, 233 Miss. 569, 104 So. 2d 296 (1958) (cerebral
thrombosis); Little v. J. Korber & Co., 71 N.M. 294, 378 P.2d 119 (1963) (heart attack);
Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14
(1961) (heart failure). Also compensable are traumatic neuroses consequent on compensable
physical injury. See, e.g., Traveler's Ins. Co. v. McLellan, 302 F. Supp. 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1969)
(emotional disturbance resulting from occupational loss of hearing); Jarka Corp. v. Hughes,
196 F. Supp. 442 (E.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 299 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1962)
(personality disorder following head injury); Fiorucci v. C.F. Braun & Co., 54 Del. 79, 173
A.2d 635 (Super. Ct. 1961) (post-surgical neurosis); Knief v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 30
App. Div. 2d 748, 291 N.Y.S.2d 463 (3d Dep't 1968) (conversion hysteria precipitated by wrist
injury).
189 See Phillips v. Air Reduction Sales Co., 337 Mo. 587, 590, 85 S.W.2d 551, 555 (1935).
Courts are disinclined to hold an employee to have forfeited compensation merely because
he was intoxicated. At least one extra-statutory approach, however, has been utilized by the
courts in disallowing an award of compensation. Referred to as the "departure from the course
of employment" approach, the claimant is said to have abandoned his employment by reach-
ing such an advanced stage of intoxication that he has rendered himself incapable of engaging
in the duties of that employment. See, e.g., John A. Rebling's Sons Co. v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 36 Cal. App. 10, 171 P. 987 (1918); Emery Motor Livery Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
291 Ill. 532, 126 N.E. 143 (1920); O'Neil v. Fred Evens Motor Sales Co., 160 S.W.2d 775 (Mo.
App. 1942). If the claimant continues to perform his duties despite his intoxication, however,
he will not be deemed to have abandoned his employment. 1A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION -LAw § 34.21 (1979). Similarly, the employer's attempt to establish drinking as
willful misconduct has generally been unsuccessful. Id. at § 34.22. States which include
intoxication as a statutory defense impose varying standards with respect to causation, thus
determining the facility with which the employer may escape liability for alcohol-related
injuries. Three states merely require proof of intoxication without regard to causation. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 48-127 (1978); NEv. Rav. STAT. § 616.565(1)(c) (1977); TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 8309, § 1 (Vernon 1967). Three others mandate that intoxication be the proximate cause
of the injury standard. IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.16(2) (West Supp. 1979-1980); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 176.021(1) (West Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (West 1959). Finally, three states
impose the stringent probative standard that intoxication be the sole cause of the injury.
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.235 (1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 45 (1979); N.Y. WORK. CoMP.
LAW § 64-10 (McKinney 1978). Thus, it is apparent that the employer will generally bear the
cost through workmen's compensation where the employee's intoxication is only partially
responsible for the accident.
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lished, these cases still involved physical injury. Defining the scope
of the employer's potential liability to the employee whose disabil-
ity, alcoholism, or drug addiction is precipitated by the job is more
difficult in light of established compensation principles. It is well
established that certain employees-the so-called "vulnerable" or
"ready" personalities-encounter risks to their mental stability in
their work environment. 9 ' These risks may arise from job content
or job organization. For example, different jobs have different tem-
peramental demands and some employees simply may not be com-
patible with a particular job.19 Similarly, there may be changes in
job content requiring adjustments which certain individuals may
find difficult.2 - Day to day problems also may create pressures on
the "ready personality.'"9 3
If mental illness can be precipitated by the work environ-
ment,9 4 why not alcoholism and drug addiction? It has been argued
that alcoholism and drug addiction are voluntary and therefore
should not be the employer's responsibility.9 5 This notion, however,
is controverted by other sources which identify alcoholism and drug
"I EMPLOYER RESPONSIBIrrY, supra note 4, at 29. The "ready" or "vulnerable" personal-
ity has a sharp predisposition for overt emotional breakdowns which may remain latent and
asymptomatic until a series of pressures and stresses pose a definite risk to their emotional
health. Id. at 29-30.
"' Id. at 30-31.
112 Id. Those risks to emotional health originating in the workplace may be broadly
divided into two groups: risks that derive from intrinsic job content and risks that arise from
features of the organization. Id. at 30. Tempermental demands of the job, stemming from
changes in technical job content and threats of job obsolescence, create for the vulnerable
individual a lack of job predictablity which in the past provided a source of emotional
stability. In addition, organizational risk factors, such as performance evaluation, status
changes through promotion, demotion, or transfer and managerial succession threaten the
"ready" employee's self-esteem and the predictablity of the people and tasks with which he
is confronted. Id. at 31-32.
'" Id. at 30.
' The most difficult problem in determining the compensability of work-related mental
illness is evidentiary. Id. at 6-9. In order to establish the necessary causal link between
protracted, non-traumatic stress and psychic injury, courts have relied upon psychiatric
speculation rather than upon medical fact. Id. at 8. Occasionally, if the mental illness mani-
fests itself at the workplace, the claimant may have the benefit of a statutory presumption
that it is work-related. See Butler v. District Parking Mgt. Co., 363 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(per curiam).
Among the mental illnesses that have been compensated as a result of job stress are
schizophrenia, Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960), neu-
rotic depression, Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 119 Ariz. 51, 579 P.2d 555
(1978) (en banc), "chronic neurosis" with anxiety, Yocom v. Pierce, 534 S.W.2d 796 (Ky.
1976), and schizophrenia with suicidal tendencies, Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor &
Indus. Relations Appeals Bd., 53 Haw. 321, 487 P.2d 278 (1971).
115 See Ogden, Justice and the Problem of the Volitional Victim, 28 LAB. L.J. 417 (1977).
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addiction as diseases or disabilities, thus suggesting that they
should share the same status as mental illness.'96 Accepting that
mental disorders, drug addiction and alcoholism can be caused by
job-related stress, the question remains as to the employer's finan-
cial accountability by virtue of workmen's compensation laws. If the
employer is to be liable, these "disorders" presumably would be
treated in the same manner as a physical injury-with the employer
bearing the costs of medical treatments and loss of earnings.
Courts have recognized job stress as a causative factor of cer-
tain physical impairments which are compensable under worker's
compensation.197 The courts also have required compensation for
mental or nervous conditions or other psychological problems trace-
able to a physical injury sustained on the job. 198 In addition, it has
been held that an employee may recover benefits for psychological
-, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see notes 24-49 and accompanying text supra, some
state handicap and disability statutes, see notes 65, 67-68, 70 & 71 and accompanying text
supra, and arbitral decisions, see notes 134-153 and accompanying text supra, provide exam-
ples of areas where alcoholism and mental illness are treated equally. As with alcoholism,
drug addiction also may conceivably be precipitated by job stress. In the case of drug abuse,
however, the volitional element seems more difficult to discount because the illicit drug user
must violate the law and usually make substantial efforts to purchase narcotics. Whereas
some employees may be said to be operating in an environment conducive to alcoholism, such
a rationale could apply to an employee's drug addiction only when he works in circumstances
in which drugs are easily acquired. Here too is the contradictory notion that drug addiction,
like alcoholism, is a disease rather than a social problem.
I" See, e.g., Hoage v. Royal Indem. Co., 90 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom.
Royal Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 302 U.S. 736 (1937) (heart attack precipitated by exhaustion);
Lamb v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 11 Cal. 3d 274, 520 P.2d 978, 113 Cal. Rptr.
162 (1974) (en banc) (preexisting hypertension, aggravated by emotional stress due to exact-
ing nature of decedent's job, contributed to fatal heart attack); Coleman v. Andrew Jergens
Co., 65 N.J. Super. 592, 168 A.2d 265 (1961) (heart attack of employee with history of
hypertension held compensable when brought about by work disturbance); Klimas v. Trans
Caribbean Airways, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961) (fatal heart
attack caused by emotional strain when decedent was placed in fear of losing his job). See
generally Larsen, The "Heart Cases" in Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis and Sug-
gested Solution, 65 MICH. L. REv. 441 (1967).
I' See, e.g., Jarka Corp. v. Hughes, 196 F. Supp. 442 (E.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other
grounds, 299 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1962)(personality and memory disorder following head injury);
Spetyla v. Industrial Comm'n, 59 Ill. 2d 1, 319 N.E.2d 40 (1974) (neurosis resulting from
concussion sustained on the job); Berger v. Hahner, Foreman & Cale, Inc., 211 Kan. 541, 506
P.2d 1175 (1973) (traumatic neurosis following loss of eye); Carter v. Avondale Shipyards,
Inc., 308 So. 2d 472 (La. App. 1975) (neurotic twitch in shoulder following injury to arm and
shoulder); Edmonds v. Kalfaian & Son, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 551, 189 N.Y.S.2d 456 (3d Dep't
1959)(mental breakdown in which compensable loss of arm was a factor).
Such physical injury need only be a "contributing cause" of the mental disorder. See
McAllister v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 69 Cal. 2d 408, 445 P.2d 313, 71 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1968); Edmonds v. Kalfaian & Son, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 551, 189 N.Y.S.2d 456 (3d Dep't
1959).
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or mental injury resulting from sudden and shocking trauma, even
in the absence of a precipitating physical injury. '99 Where, however,
the job-related stresses gradually accumulate and eventually cause
the emotional or nervous disorder, without any physical manifesta-
tion, the responsibility of the employer under worker's compensa-
tion is by no means certain,2°° although courts are starting to permit
recovery. For example, in Carter v. General Motors Corp., "' the
plaintiff was an assembly-line worker who had difficulty keeping up
with his assigned tasks and developed paranoid schizophrenia. The
court granted compensation, concluding that there was no require-
ment that the mental trauma be tied to a single event.2 12 The Ari-
"I See, e.g., Lyng v. Rao, 72 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1954) (stenographer afflicted with chest pains
after her building had been struck by lightning); Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62
111. 2d 556, 343 N.E.2d 913 (1976) (claimant experienced headaches, numbness and nervous-
ness as result of witnessing severance of a co-worker's hand in machinery); In re Fitzgibbons,
- Mass. _ 373 N.E.2d 1174 (Mass. 1978) (corrections officer suffered psychotic-
depressive reaction from inmate disturbance). In Bailey v. AmericanGen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex.
430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955), plaintiff suffered a severe shock when a scaffold on which he was
standing collapsed, resulting in the death of a fellow worker. He later suffered a "disabling
neurosis" and "anxiety." An award was affirmed even though the state statute required
"harm to the physical structure of the claimant's body" as a prerequisite to recovery.
The landmark case in the emotional trauma area is Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co.,
36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1975), wherein the claimant discovered
the body of her supervisor who had committed suicide in his office. She suffered an acute
depressive reaction requiring shock treatments. The New York Court of Appeals held that
psychological or nervous injury caused by psychic trauma was compensable to the same
extent as physical injury. Id. at 510, 330 N.E.2d at 606, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 641. See generally
Render, Mental Illness as An Industrial Accident, 31 TENN. L. REV. 288 (1964); Note,
Workmen's Compensation-The Compensability of Nervous Injuries from Psychic
Trauma-Who's Afraid of Wolfe?, 25 U. KA. L. Rav. 158 (1976).
10 See 1B A. LAsoN, WORnMEN'S COMPFNSAMON LAW § 42.23(b) (1979).
2'1 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960).
I" Id. at 580, 106 N.W.2d at 113. The Carter claimant's job-related stress was classified
as "ordinary" day-to-day tension. Id. at 582, 106 N.W.2d at 109. The court recognized the
broad implications of its decision when it noted that the ordered compensation would tend
to place upon industry the economic burden of mental disability caused by ordinary job
pressures. Id.
Several alternative approaches have been suggested to distinguish compensable from
non-compensable protracted stress injuries. New York courts have taken a dual stance, in
some cases requiring that the injury-producing stress be greater than the "wear and tear" of
ordinary non-employment life, see, e.g., Mulholland v. New York State Dep't of Pub. Works,
34 App. Div. 2d 1083, 312 N.Y.S.2d 687 (3d Dep't 1970); Ferreri v. General Auto Driving
School, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 601, 271 N.Y.S.2d 421 (3d Dep't 1966), and in others applying
the "other employee" test, wherein the stress experienced must be greater than that endured
by other employees similarly situated. See, e.g., Zygler v. Tenzer Coat Co., 19 App. Div. 2d
660, 240 N.Y.S.2d 543 (3d Dep't 1963), affl'd, 15 N.Y.2d 562, 203 N.E.2d 217, 254 N.Y.S.2d
537 (1964); Cramer v. Barney's Clothing Store, 15 App. Div. 2d 329, 223 N.Y.S.2d 813 (3d
Dep't 1962), affrd, 13 N.Y.2d 711, 191 N.E.2d 901, 241 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1963); accord, Swiss
Colony, Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 72 Wis. 2d 46, 240 N.W.2d
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zona Supreme Court similarly has permitted compensation for
"mental breakdown" caused by job tensions." 3 Another court al-
lowed an employee who became schizophrenic to take advantage of
a statute granting him a presumption that his mental disorder was
work-related. 04 The court assumed sub silentio that his stress-
induced mental condition was compensable.0 5
The trend to grant compensation for mental injury caused by
job-related mental stress even if the stress is "ordinary and grad-
ual"20 reflects recognition of the notion that, where the employee is
disabled and has lost his earning capacity, it matters little whether
the injury was physical or mental.'0 ' This trend, however, portends
128 (1976); School Dist. No. 1 v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis.
2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974). But see Malone, Workmen's Compensation, The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term, 24 LA. L. REv. 244, 249 (1964).
20 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, f19 Ariz. 51, 579 P.2d 555 (1978). The
Fireman's Fund claimant, described as a "conscientious employee and a perfectionist," id.
at 52, 579 P.2d at 556, assumed greatly increased job responsibilities and pressures when her
company expanded. Following an altercation with a customer, she left the office and in the
evening took a slight overdose of sleeping pills. Id. at 53, 579 P.2d at 557. The applicable
compensation statute provided: "Every employee covered by insurance in the state compen-
sation fund who is injured by accident .. .shall receive such medical, nurse and hospital
services and medicines . ..as provided in this chapter." Id. (emphasis added). The court
rejected the notion that "accident" necessarily imports physical impact or exertion, holding
instead that "an injury is caused 'by accident' when either the external cause or the resulting
injury itself is unexpected or accidental." Id. (quoting Paulley v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Ariz.
266, 272, 371 P.2d 888, 893 (1962)). Thus, plaintiff's injury was sufficiently unanticipated to
fall within the statutory definition. Id.
204 Butler v. District Parking Mgt. Co., 363 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (per curiam).
205 Id. at 684. In Butler, the claimant, who had been employed as a parking lot attendant
for 20 years, became ill during working hours and failed to report to work thereafter. He was
diagnosed as having suffered a mental breakdown, schizophrenia reaction. The Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 920 (1976), under which his claim
was brought, 363 F.2d at 683, provides in pertinent part: "it shall be presumed, in the absence
of substantial evidence to the contrary (a) that the claim comes within the provisions of this
chapter." 33 U.S.C. § 920 (1976). The Butler court held that the employer had failed to meet
its statutory burden of proof to rebut the presumption that illness or injury occurring during
employment was caused by that employment, and thus compensation was granted. Id. at 684.
2" See note 207 and accompanying text infra. But see, e.g., Verdugo v. Industrial
Comm'n, 114 Ariz. 477, 561 P.2d 1249, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 863 (1977); Muse v. Industrial
Comm'n, 27 Ariz. App. 312, 554 P.2d 908 (1976); Jacobs v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 196
Kan. 613, 412 P.2d 986 (1966); Erhart v. Great W. Sugar Co., 169 Mont. 375, 546 P.2d 1055
(1976); School Dist. No. 1 v. Department of Indus., Health & Labor Relations, 62 Wis. 2d
370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974). In Ayer v. Industrial Comm'n, 23 Ariz. App. 163, 531 P.2d 208
(1975), the court stated that to compensate for injury caused by the gradual buildup of
emotional stress rather than by an unexpected injury-causing event would be to "literally
open Pandora's Box permitting compensation to any disgruntled employee who leaves [her]
job in a huff because of an emotional disturbance." Id. at 167, 531 P.2d at 211 (quoting Shope
v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Ariz. App. 23, 25, 495 P.2d 148, 150 (1972)).
17 See Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Appeal Bd., 53 Haw. 322,
328, 487 P.2d 278, 282 (1971); Render, Mental Illness as An Industrial Accident, 31 TENN. L.
EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY
enormous financial responsibility. 28 As with physical injuries, it
would undoubtedly pressure the employer into protecting the em-
ployee from job-induced alcoholism, drug addiction or mental ill-
ness by identifying the vulnerable personality at any early stage and
taking preventative measures. Steps may be taken to match the
employee with the tempermental demands of the job211 or, more
likely, encourage or even provide rehabilitation measures at an early
stage when it is easier to deal with the disorder. 210 One important
question left unanswered by the Carter line of cases is the extent to
which the alcoholic, drug addicted or mentally disabled employee
is entitled to compensation if his behavioral disorder is a mere
"surfacing" of a preexisting problem. The employer may have hired
the individual pursuant to laws prohibiting discrimination against
the recovered individual who can presently perform the job. It is
questionable whether the employer should be held financially re-
sponsible when the problem recurs, even though the employer has
had no opportunity to reject an employee on the basis of the em-
REv. 288, 293 (1964); Comment, Workmen's Compensation-Compensability of Mental In-
jury-In re Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr. Co., 21 N.Y.L.F. 465, 476 (1976).
The controversy surrounding the compensability of gradual injuries, physical as well as
mental, stems from the "accident" requirement in most compensation statutes. 1B A. LAR-
SON, WoRKME_'s CopMENsATIoN LAw §§ 39.10 & 39.50 (1979 & Feb. Supp. 1979). The accident
concept imparts an element of reasonable definiteness in time, the practical function of which
includes the tolling of applicable notice and claim periods and the attribution of liability
between successive employers. Id. at § 39.10. Most jurisdictions, however, have satisfied the
time-definiteness issue by suddenness in either the precipitating cause, id., or the manifesta-
tion of the disability. Id. at § 39.50. Three tests have been utilized in discerning "accident"
in gradually developed injuries. Some courts have denied altogether the validity of the defi-
nite time requirement, see, e.g., Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 368,
128 A. 635 (1925), although others have applied the repeated trauma test, whereby each tiny
trauma or exposure is deemed a separate accidental occurrence, see, e.g., Worden v. Pratt &
Whitney Aircraft, 256 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1972); Neilson v. Michael Stern & Co., 282 App. Div.
793, 122 N.Y.S.2d 472 (3d Dep't 1953). Generally, however, the "accidental injury compo-
nent" is supplied by the manifestation of the disability or the occurrence of pain. See, e.g.,
Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Ariz. App. 305, 497 P.2d 531 (1972);
Stein v. Schneider, 34 App. Div. 2d 1062, 312 N.Y.S.2d 95 (3d Dep't 1970); Jones v. Curran
& Co., 33 App. Div. 2d 525, 303 N.Y.S.2d 541 (3d Dep't 1969). But see Thomas v. Carter Fruit
& Produce Co., 137 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1962); Johnson v. Gulfport Laundry & Cleaning Co., 249
Miss. 11, 162 So. 2d 859 (1964); Bess v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 469 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. Ct. App.
1971).
2M The financial costs of compensating job-induced mental injury is probably greater
than with physical injury. See H. TRicE & J. BELAsco, supra note 2, at 3-12.
See notes 11, 59, 141-167 and accompanying text supra.
210 See notes 11 & 12 and accompanying text supra.
2" No statistical studies have been found, however, which validate a supposition that the
recovered alcoholic is more vulnerable to future work impairment due to alcoholism than
someone in the general population who has never had a history of alcoholism. The same is
true of mental illness and drug addiction.
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ployee's potential vulnerability. There is, however, some support for
continued liability to the employer. In cases involving physical inju-
ries, courts have indicated that the employer "takes his employee
as he finds him,"212 and thus even if the employee would have devel-
oped a problem anyway, his previous history would not bar compen-
sation .2 1 This rationale can be extended to the troubled employee
whose problem recurs or intensifies.
In delineating the scope of an employer's compensation liability
to the troubled employee who develops alcoholism or drug addic-
tion, courts will be confronted with a twofold inquiry. First, they
must determine whether alcoholism or drug addiction or both are
analogous to mental disorders induced by job-related stress and
second, whether the amount of evidence offered to prove the neces-
sary causal nexus must be more compelling in the case of the alco-
holic or drug addict. To date, these questions remain unresolved.
The employer also faces a dilemma, that is, whether it is financially
more burdensome to defend and, if he loses, pay the compensation
claim, or to establish preventive and rehabilitative programs or poli-
cies. The experience of many companies which employ these pro-
grams2 14 as well as arbitral decisions argue in favor of the latter.
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed in this Article the relevant federal and state
laws prohibiting handicap discrimination, the decisions of arbitra-
tors and workmen's compensation laws, it is fair to say that there
is a convergence of pressures on the employer to develop construc-
tive methods of dealing with the "troubled" employee-the alco-
212 See, e.g., Roger v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 33 App. Div. 2d 1074, 307 N.Y.S.2d
589 (3d Dep't 1970); Wheeler V. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 513 S.W.2d 179 (Tenn. 1974); 1 A. LARSON,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 12.20 n.54 (1978).
213 See, e.g., Robinson v. Bradshaw, 206 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 899
(1953); Old King Mining Co. v. Mullins, 252 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1952); Doucet v. Ashey Constr.
Co., 134 So. 2d 665 (La. Ct. App. 1961); Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, 394 Mich. 466, 232
N.W.2d 146 (1975); Wade Lahar Constr. Co. v. Howell, 376 P.2d 221 (Okla. 1962); Jacobson
v. Department of Labor & Indus., 37 Wash. 444, 224 P.2d 338 (1950). Preexisting physical
conditions aggravated by employment are compensable. See, e.g., Potenza v. United Termin-
als, Inc., 524 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1975) (cancer); Bedwell v. Industrial Comm'n, 9 Ariz. App.
350, 452 P.2d 131, vacated, 104 Ariz. 443, 454 P.2d 985 (1969) (cancer); Noble County High-
way Dep't v. Sorenfrei, 163 Ind. App. 81, 321 N.E.2d 766 (1975) (leukemia); Kauffman v. Co-
operative Refinery Ass'n, 170 Kan. 325, 225 P.2d 129 (1950) (hernia); Smith v. I.R. Equip.
Corp., 60 App. Div. 2d 746, 400 N.Y.S.2d 900 (3d Dep't 1977) (emphysema); Perez v. Pearl-
Wick Corp., 56 App. Div. 2d 239, 392 N.Y.S.2d 496 (3d Dep't 1977) (arthritis).




holic, drug addict or mentally ill. To begin, some federal and state
laws are forcing employers to recognize the possibility of successful
rehabilitation of the troubled employee by requiring the employer
to include in its work force employees who have suffered from work-
impairing alcoholism, drug addiction or mental illness in the past.
The federal and some state laws further require the employer to
"accomodate." Thus, while the employer may discharge a troubled
employee who is not performing satisfactorily, he presumably can-
not do so if the employee will be able to perform with some
"accomodation" by the employer. Certainly the duty to
"accomodate" does not per se require the institution of an occupa-
tional rehabilitation program. The employer who has made avail-
able a well-run rehabilitation program to the employee, however,
will.have gone far in meeting his obligation to accomodate.
Furthermore, arbitrators have made impossible facile discharge
of such employees who develop problems after a period of satisfac-
tory employment. On the whole, with some inconsistencies in the
area of drug addiction, arbitrators are demanding that employers
not only recognize that there is a possibility for rehabilitation, but
that they assume some responsibility for the undertaking of rehabil-
itation before discharging the troubled employee. This responsibil-
ity may range from giving the individual a chance to rehabilitate
himself to taking positive steps to encourage and supervise the reha-
bilitation. Finally, the placing of economic liability on the employer
for mental disorders caused by job stress under workmen's compen-
sation laws may be encouraging employers to assume responsibility
for rehabilitation of some troubled employees. Whether this eco-
nomic liability will extend to alcoholism or drug addiction caused
by job tensions is less certain.
Interestingly, as pressures increase on the employer to assume
responsibility for the troubled employee, counter-balancing pres-
sures are placed on the employee. Thus, there is the increasingly
emphasized notion and recognition that the employee also must
bear some responsibility. The laws emphasize that the employer's
obligation not to discriminate does not include a duty to hire or
retain an employee who is not performing or is not capable of per-
forming his job. In addition, whereas early arbitration cases dealing
with alcoholics sometimes reinstated the alcoholic unconditionally,
reinstatement in the modern cases is almost uniformly conditioned
on the employee's continued participation in a rehabilitation pro-
gram. Imposing this condition recognizes that reinstatement with-
out therapy, which was often the order in the past, is useless. Thus,
1979]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
while imposing obligations on employers to give the employee a
chance to rehabilitate himself, the employee must take advantage
of this chance. Arbitrators today recognize that at some point the
employer may terminate the employee who, although given a
chance for rehabilitation, has not been rehabilitated for whatever
reason. 15 The existence of a well-run occupational rehabilitation
program would undoubtedly assist the employer in establishing, to
the satisfaction of the courts, administrative agencies and arbitra-
tors, that the discharged employee was properly terminated. More-
over, the costs of instituting and maintaining a prevention and re-
habilitation program are less than those attributable to operational
losses and termination expenditures caused by non-productive
troubled employees.
In all, it seems clear that more and more employers will assume
responsibility for the rehabilitation of the troubled employee as the
most constructive, humane and least costly path available. In so
doing, the employer at best will be able to convert non-productive
employees into productive ones and at least to cut short company
losses attributed to long-term tolerance of the non-productive em-
ployee by identifying those employees, fulfilling company obliga-
tions to them with respect to rehabilitation and terminating the
employees who cannot comply. In the long run, these policies will
benefit employers as well as employees.
2-5 Whether that individual can then claim Workmen's Compensation benefits (including
lost earnings) claiming that his condition was caused by job stress is an open question.
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